Search

PARTITION SUIT – SALE DEED NOT BINDING RELIEF – LIMITATION – EXPLAINED BY JUSTICE V. JAGANNATHAN


IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, IN A CASE OF  SUSHEELAMMA VS. SHIVAKUMAR AND ORS,   DECIDED ON NOV 19 2008, REPORTED IN 2010 (2) KARLJ 195,   JUDGEMENT BY JUSTICE V. JAGANNATHAN, J.

CASES CITED:  

Ningawwa v Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar and Others, AIR 1968 SC 956
Ram Charan Das v Girja Nandini Devi and Others, AIR 1966 SC 323:
Ramaiah v N. Narayana Reddy (deceased) by L.Rs, 2004(6) Kar. L.J. 164 (SC);
Krishna Chandra Bose v Commissioner of Ranchi. AIR 1981 SC 707:
Ramachandra Jivaji Kanago and Another v Laxman Shrinivas Naik and Another, AIR 1945 PC 54 :
Appanna v Jami Venkatappadu, AIR 1953 Mad. 611 (DB);
K.S. Mariyappa and Others v K.T. Siddalinga Setty and Others, 1989(1) Kar. L.J. 150 (DB);
Kona Adinarayana v Dronavalli Venkata Subbayya, AIR 1937 Mad. 869;
Pillanna alias Thimmiah v Syed Nasurodeen Sab, 1921(27) MCCR 11;
Smt. Bismillah v Janeshwar Prasad and Others, AIR 1990 SC 540: (1990)1 SCC 207;
Thamma Venkata Subbamma (dead) by L.R. v Thamma Rattamma and Others, AIR 1987 SC 1775 :  

IMPORTANT COURT OBSERVATIONS OF CASE:- 30. The Trial Court had dismissed the suit as barred by limitation. But, the lower Appellate Court held it otherwise. The main argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants is that the lower Appellate Court was totally in error in taking a contrary view as regards the limitation point is concerned. Since the facts are not in dispute, it is clear that the partition took place in the family in the year 1961 and thereafter, in respect of one of the items of the joint family i.e., the suit item, in the year 1969, there was a deed of relinquishment executed by the fourth defendant and the first defendant in favour of Patel Mallegowda and, by that deed, the suit property was relinquished in favour of Patel Mallegowda in view of Patel Mallegowda being shouldered with the responsibility of clearing the mortgage loan standing against the suit property.

31. Subsequent to the said event of 1961, there was also a partition within the family of the plaintiffs in the year 1982. At that point of time, the plaintiffs, being the younger brothers of fourth defendant- Rajashekhar, did not raise any questions regarding the relinquishment of the suit property in favour of Patel Mallegowda by the plaintiffs' eldest brother Rajashekar and first defendant-Shanthappa. The plaintiffs have contended before the Trial Court in their pleadings that the cause of action for the suit arose only about two months prior to the filing of the suit when the defendants tried to interfere with the plaintiffs' possession. The suit itself was filed on 18-11-1994. Therefore, from the date of relinquishment deed i.e., 13-3-1969, the suit was filed almost after 25 years and if the time is reckoned from the partition effected within the family of the plaintiffs i.e., in the year 1982, still the suit came to be filed almost after 12 years.

32. The first relief sought in the plaint is to declare the relinquishment deed dated 13-3-1969 as invalid (the word used m Kannada is "Asindhu"). The second relief sought is consequent to the first prayer being granted, the plaintiffs are entitled to their separate share and possession from out of the suit property, which is put at 1 acre and 33 guntas to each one of them, and also for mesne profits, therefore, it is clear that the plaintiffs getting their share depends upon declanng the relinquishment deed as invalid.

33. The period of limitation prescribed under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to obtain any other declaration other than what is mentioned in Articles 56 and 57 is three years and the time starts to run when the right to sue first accrues. Therefore, it has to be found out as to when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiffs.

34. Though in the plaint, at paragraph 12, it is stated that the plaintiffs came to know of the deed of relinquishment only two months prior to the filing of the suit and that, for two years prior to filing of the suit, the defendants have been trying to interfere with the plantitts possession of the suit property, the documents produced by the defendants viz., Exs, D. 1 to D. 10 and Ex. D.12 which is the relinquishment deed, indicated that the khatha stood m the name of the first defendant pursuant to the deed of relinquishment and the plaintiffs had not questioned the said khatha in the name of the first defendant before any forum.

35. Secondly, it has also come in the evidence of P.W. 1-Vinoda, that, at the time of the relinquishment deed i.e., in the year 1969 except the fourth plaintiff, all other plaintiffs were aged more than 18 years and the learned Judge of the Trial Court has also referred to the year in which each one of the plaintiffs attained majority and has observed in paragraph 18 of his judgment that all the plaintiffs had attained majority and the plaintiffs woke up to question the validity of the relinquishment deed after a lapse of more than three years from the date of their attaining majority. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court has not referred to this part of the reasoning of the Trial Court, in her judgment.

36 Further, the very same witness P.W. 1 has also admitted in the course of his evidence that on 13-3-1969, defendants 3 and 4 executed the relinquishment deed in favour of Patel Mallegowda and has also stated further that in the very year in which the relinquishment deed was executed, the khatha also stood transferred. The witness has also further stated in the course of his cross-examination that he and his brothers had a partition effected in the year 1982.

37 In the light of the aforesaid evidence on record, the learned Judge of the Trial Court, therefore, held that the suit of the plaintiffs was hopelessly barred by time. The lower Appellate Court did not take the trouble of examining the evidence properly and did not even refer to the reasons given by the Trial Court as regards the suit being barred by limitation is concerned.

38. The learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs strongly contended that there is no concept of kartha of the joint family, relinquishing the joint family property in favour of any one and the alienation that is permitted is only either by sale or by mortgage and, as such, fourth defendant-Rajashekhar could not have relinquished the suit property in favour of Patel Mallegowda and it is also argued in the same vein that, at the most, the fourth defendant could have relinquished his interest in the suit property but not the interest of the plaintiffs as the said Rajashekar was not the guardian of the plaintiffs nor the kartha of the family. The decision that is referred to in this regard is the one reported in Thamma Venkata Subbamma. I have carefully gone through the said decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Thamma Venkata Subbamma. It has been held in the said case by the Apex Court that if a coparcener relinquishes his interest in favour of another, it enures for the benefit of the remaining coparceners also. Relying on the aforesaid observation, the learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs contended that even if Rajashekar had relinquished his share in favour of Patel Mallegowda under the deed of relinquishment, the same would enure to the benefit of the other coparceners including the plaintiffs. But, at the same time, the interests of the other coparceners could not have been relinquished by Rajashekar.

39. The very same decision also gives an indication that the concept of relinquishing or renunciation is also not alien to Hindu Law. In fact, a passage from Mulla's Hindu Law (15th Edition) has also been excerpted and Article 264 at page 357 is as under:
"Article 264. (1) Renunciation or relinquishment of his share:- A coparcener may renounce his interest in the coparcenary property in favour of the other coparceners as a body but not in favour of one or more of them. If he renounces in favour of one or more of them the renunciation enures for the benefit of all other coparceners and not for coparceners in whose favour the renunciation is made. Such renunciation is not invalid even if the renouncing coparcener makes it a condition that he would be paid something towards maintenance. The renunciation or relinquishment must, of course, be genuine. If fictitious and not acted upon it would not be operative as between the parties and partition can be claimed".

40. Therefore, it is clear from the aforesaid observation that the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs that except sale and mortgage, there can be no other form of alienation, does not carry much conviction and the Apex Court in the very case under discussion has observed that though the transaction is ostensibly gift, but really the donor meant to relinquish his interest in the coparcenary in favour of the brother and his sons and such renunciation enures for the benefit of all other coparceners and, as such, the gift may be construed as renunciation or relinquishment. Hence, the aforesaid decision, in my view, instead of coming to the assistance of the learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs, supports the case of the appellants.

41. The next contention that is put forward by the learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs with much persuation is that the relinquishment deed Ex. D. 12 is a void document and, therefore, the plaintiffs can ignore the same and, as such, the question of the suit of the plaintiffs being barred by time from the date of the deed of relinquishment does not arise. Before answering the said contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs, it is proper to refer to the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as by other High Courts in the decisions referred to by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, as a reference to the same would provide the answer to the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs.

42. In the case of K.S. Mariyappa, a Division Bench of this Court has held that where a suit was filed as one for declaration that the preliminary and final decrees passed were nullity because they were tainted with fraud and coercion, if such a relief is granted, in effect, it would result in setting aside the preliminary and final decrees and the Court went on to observe that, in fact, without getting the preliminary and final decrees set aside or cancelled, the plaintiffs are not entitled to reopening of the partition because, their father was a party to the preliminary and final decrees passed in the previous suit. In the instant case also, the plaintiffs, by seeking the relief of partition and separate possession of their share in the suit property are, in effect, calling in question the deed of relinquishment of the year 1969, which is a registered document. Therefore, unless and until the said deed of relinquishment is set aside, the question of the plaintiffs staking a claim for share in the suit property will not arise.

43. In the case of Ramachandra Jivaji Kanago, it has been held that the fact that the transaction of gift was brought about by undue influence, does not necessarily mean that it was not made voluntarily within the meaning of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and is, therefore, void. Where the donor wished to make a gift and acted voluntarily in making it, but the transaction was induced by undue influence, the gift is only voidable and requires to be set aside before the property conveyed by it can be claimed by the donee or anyone claiming through him and Article 91 applies to such a case and when the donee was aware of the character of the transaction when he executed the deed, limitation for setting aside the deed of gift would run from the date of the gift because under Article 91 time runs from the date of the knowledge.
44. The next decision is the one in the case of Kona Adiruirciyana, and it was held in the said case that, where the eldest brother of a joint Hindu family as kartha entered into a contract of sale of an item of joint family property, wherein he signed it for himself and as representing the minor brother, the contention that the contract could not be said to have been entered into on behalf of the family and all the members of the family were not parties as the minor was separately represented by the kartha was negatived by the Court by holding that the kartha alone could represent the minor member and, in fact, he alone could represent by himself the entire family and, therefore, the kartha must be deemed to have represented the entire family and the other brother signing it is only by way of concurrence.

45. In the case of Appanna, it was held by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court that Article 91 presupposes that a suit is necessary under the law to set aside the instrument. But, where under the law, there is no duty cast on the person to get an instrument set aside, the Article does not impose any obligation on him and the fact that there is a prayer for declaration that a deed is void or that it should be set aside, does not affect the position and such prayers being ancillary to the substantive prayer for possession may be regarded as mere surplusage.

46. In the case on hand, the plaintiffs' main prayer is to declare the relinquishment deed is invalid and the subsequent prayer is to grant their share in the suit item. Therefore, it cannot be said that the prayer seeking the relinquishment deed to be declared as invalid is an ancillary prayer but, in my view, the said prayer is the substantive prayer in the present suit.

47. As far as the decision in the case of Ram Charan Das, is concerned, it has been held in the said case that the Courts give effect to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that its object is to settle existing or future disputes regarding property amongst members of a family and in this context, the word "family" is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons of which law recognises as having a right of succession by having a claim to a share in the disputed property. The consideration for a family settlement is the expectation that such a settlement will result in establishing or ensuring amity and goodwill amongst the relations. That consideration having passed by each of the disputants the settlement consisting of recognition of the right by each other cannot be permitted to be impeached thereafter. It was further observed in the said case that a party who had taken benefit under the transaction was not now entitled to turn round and say that the transaction was of a kind which the other lady party could not enter into and was therefore invalid.

48. This decision also applies to the case on hand inasmuch as it is an admitted fact that there was a mortgage loan hanging over the suit property and in order to clear the said loan which would ultimately benefit the whole family that the deed of relinquishment came into picture and Patel Mallegowda was entrusted with the responsibility of dealing the said loan.

49. In the case of Ramaiah, it has been held by the Apex Court that applicability of the relevant article of the Limitation Act, 1963 will have to be decided on the basis of the pleadings. But, by suppression of material facts and skillful pleading, the plaintiff cannot seek to avoid inconvenient article and, after observing thus, the Apex Court found in the case before it that the suit was filed by the appellant in 1984 without disclosing that admittedly he was ousted from the property in 1971 and, therefore, applying Article 64, the Apex Court found that the suit had been filed 13 years after dispossession and accordingly, it was held barred by limitation.

50. In the instant case also, from the evidence of P.W. 1, it has come out in clear terms that barring one plaintiff, the other had attained majority on the date of execution of the relinquishment deed in the year 1969 and one of the date of execution of the relinquishment deed in the year 1969 and one of the plaintiffs, who was a minor, also attained majority and the present suit is filed in the year 1984 long after the completion of three years period from the date of attaining of each one of the plaintiffs. Therefore, by skillfully mentioning in the pleadings that the plaintiffs came to know about the relinquishment deed only about two months prior to the filing of the suit, they cannot avoid the limitation period that is applicable to the case on hand having regard to the nature of the suit that is filed viz., suit for declaration of the relinquishment deed of the year 1969 as invalid.

51. Another decision referred to by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants is the judgment of this Court in an unreported case in R.S.A. No. 745 of 1975, disposed of on 20-4-1983, and it was held in the said case in facts that where the father of the plaintiff had relinquished his share in favour of the defendant by executing the documents Exs. D.7 and D.8 and later, the defendant were in possession of the share of the plaintiff in the joint family properties, and when the evidence revealed that following the death of the plaintiff''s father in the year 1935, the plaintiff never raised his little finger to claim his share in the joint family properties till he filed the suit in the year 1965. That itself probabilises that the plaintiff did not take any action because he knew early that his father of the defendants as otherwise, as a man partition in the year 1948.

52. The facts, more or less, can be comparable to the facts of the case before us in the sense, even in the present case, defendants 3 and 4 relinquished the interest in the suit property in favour of Patel Mallegowda in 1969 and even according to P.W. 1, on the very day itself, khatha was also changed in the name of Patel Mallegowda and thereafter, the plaintiffs did not raise their little finger when there was partition in the plaintiffs'' family in the year 1982 and furthermore, even after attaining the age of majority and long after that, the plaintiffs slept over their right, if they had any, and did not file the suit to question the validity of the relinquishment deed within three years of attaining the age of their majority.

53. In the next decision in the case of Smt. Bismillah, the Apex Court was dealing with a case where the issue revolved on a plea of nullity of certain sale deeds and the High Court had held that the plaint averment which amounted to plea of nullity of the transactions was only a prayer which was simply illusory but the main relief was that of the relief of possession. The Apex Court, reversing the above finding of the High Court, held that in order to determine the precise nature of the action, the pleadings should be taken as a whole and the real substance of the case has to be gathered by construing the pleadings as a whole and then refer to the law laid down by it in earlier decisions which are to be found at paragraphs 10 and 15 as mentioned hereunder:

"10. Indeed in Gorakh Nath Dube v Hari Narain Singh and Others, (1973)2 SCC 535, this Court, dealing with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of the Holdings Act, 1954 where the provision excluding the Civil Court's jurisdiction is even wider, has had occasion to observe: (SCR p. 342: SCC p. 538, para 5)
"... but, where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a Court having the power to cancel it....".

15. This decision was referred to with approval by this Court in Ningawwa v Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar and Others, AIR 1968 SC 956. It was observed: (SCR pp. 800-01) "It is well-established that a contract or other transaction induced or tainted by fraud is not void, but only voidable at the option of the party defrauded. Until it is avoided, the transaction is valid, so that third parties without notice of the fraud may in the mean time acquire rights and interests in the matter which they may enforce against the party defrauded".

This would be a voidable transaction. But the position was held to be different if the fraud or misrepresentation related to the character of the document. This Court held: (SCR p. 801)

"The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable".

However the House of Lords in Saunders v Anglia Building Society, 1971 AC 1004, reviewed the law and held that the essential features of the doctrine, as expressed by Byles, J. in Foster v Mackinnon, 1869 LR 4 CP 704, had been correctly stated. Lord Reid, however observed: (AC headnote at p. 1005)

"The plea of non est factum could not be available to any one who signed without taking the trouble to find out at least the general effect of the document. Nor could it be available to a person whose mistake was really a mistake as to the legal effect of the document. There must be a radical or fundamental difference between what he signed and what he thought he was signing"".

54. The last of the decisions is in the case of Pillanna alias Thimmiah. The Court was dealing with the expression "set aside" used in Article 91 of the Limitation Act, 1911 and posed to itself the question viz., can the plaintiff recover possession without cancelling the sale which is, in the eye of law, a reality, and answered it as under: "It is a fundamental principle of law that 'if a sale is a reality at all, it is a reality defeasible only in the way pointed out by law'', and 'anybody who desires relief inconsistent with it may and should pray to set it aside'. (See Malkarjun v Narhari, (1900)25 B. 337 (350, 352) (PC)). What then is the procedure prescribed by law to get rid of the effect of a voidable instrument?

In India, it is not expressly laid down in any statute that a person who comes in as plaintiff claiming relief against the effect of a deed voidable at his instance should have it judicially rescinded before or at the time of his getting the relief. Common Law of England has been followed in this country and will be a safe guide in determining this point. According to it, it is necessary 'to maintain an action or analogous proceedings for the purpose of having the contract or transaction declared void and rescinded by the Court, in which event it is deemed to have been void ab initio' (See Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 20, para 1745).

According to the Indian Contract Act, Section 17(a), it is clear that the rescission of the contract unless accepted by the other party, must be by a judicial pronouncement. A mere unilateral repudiation in pais (e.g., effected by act out of Court) cannot constitute an effectual rescission of a contract. (See Bigelow on Fraud, pages 74 to 69). This view is confirmed by the provisions of Indian Contract Act and Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Articles 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 44 provides as shown above for suits to set aside the obstacles affecting adversely the interest of the plaintiff. Article 114 provides for the rescission of a contract. Thus by implication Indian Law requires judicial rescission. Sir H.H. Shephard says that Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act indicates that 'rescission imports a judicial decision, and that 'rescission by a person entitling to rescind means that he, having resolved not to persist in demanding performance is in a position to sue for rescission or to defend an action brought on the contract5. (See 24, Madras Law Journal 55 at page 59).

It follows therefore that the plaintiff has to sue for rescission in a Court of law, and if he omits to take such a step within the time fixed under Article 91, the instrument will operate as a bar for the relief claimed by her against the tenor of the instrument. There is no principle on which suits involving the issue of validity of an instrument should, if of a declaratory nature, be brought within one period of time, but if involving relief based on that declaration, may be brought within another period of time. The combination of several claims in a suit would not deprive each claim of its specific character and description".

55. As far as the contention put forward by the learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs that the relinquishment deed is void ab initio is concerned, it has no merit in view of the very argument of the learned Counsel that to the extent of Rajashekar relinquishing his interest in the suit item in favour of Patel Mallegowda is concerned, the said act would enure to the benefit of the other coparceners also and the only grievance is that the interest of the plaintiffs could not have been relinquished by defendants 3 and 4 in favour of Patel Mallegowda. We have also seen from the very first relief that the claim in the suit that all that the plaintiffs seek in the form of declaration is to declare the relinquishment deed as invalid. Therefore, the question of the relinquishment deed being labelled as "void" does not arise and, in the instant case, it could be classified as a document which is voidable at the instance of the aggrieved persons.

56. Therefore, the distinction between void and voidable needs to be kept in view and, in this regard, it is appropriate to refer to the commentary of U.N. Mitra on Law of Limitation and Prescription (12th Edition - Volume 1) wherein, at page 1176, the learned author has drawn the distinction between Void' and 'voidable' very succinctly as under:

"3-A. Distinction between void and voidable:- The expression "void" has several facets. One type of void acts, transactions decrees are those which are wholly without jurisdiction, ab initio void and for avoiding the same no declaration is necessary and law does not take any notice of the same and it can be disregarded in collateral proceeding or otherwise. The other type of "void" act e.g. may be transaction against a minor without being represented by a next friend. Such a transaction is a good transaction against the whole World. So far as the minor is concerned, if he decides to avoid the same and succeeds m avoiding it by taking recourse to appropriate proceedings the transaction becomes void from the very beginning Another type of void act may be one which is not a nullity, but for avoiding the same a declaration has to be made. Voidable act is that which is good act unless avoided e.g. if a suit is filed for declaration that a document is fraudulent and/or foiled and fabricated it is voidable as the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs and a party who alleges otherwise is obliged to prove it. If it is proved that the document is foiled and fabricated and a declaration to that effect is given, the transaction becomes void from the very beginning. There may be voidable transactions which is required to be set aside and the same is avoided from the day it is so set aside and not any day Prior to cases, where legal effect of a document cannot be taken away without setting aside the same it cannot be treated to be void, but would be obviously voidable. The word Void' has a relative rather than absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of invalidity depending upon the gravity of infirmity, as to whether it is fundamental or otherwise. The word "void" need not automatically indicate that any disposition should be ab initio void The legal implication of the word "void" need not necessarily be a stage of nullity in all contingencies".

Therefore the word Void' has a relative rather than absolute meaning and it only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal and the word "void" need not automatically indicate that any disposition should be ab intitio void but the legal implication of the word ''void" need not necessarily be a stage of nullity in all contingencies.

57. The learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs, in the course of his arguments, also had submitted that the plaintiffs were not seeking cancellation of the relinquishment deed, but their only prayer is to declare the said deed as invalid. The appropriate article applicable for seeking cancellation or setting aside an instrument or decree or for rescission of a contract is Article 59. But, where the prayer is to declare the deed of relinquishment as an invalid one, the article that is attracted will be Article 59. But, where the prayer is to declare the deed of relinquishment as an invalid one, the article that is attracted will be Article 58 and, therefore, if the said argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs is to be taken note of viz., that the plaintiffs are not seeking for cancellation of the relinquishment deed, but only a declaration, then, Article 58 would come into play and the limitation period is three years from the time when right to sue first accrues.

58. Therefore looked from any angle, the suit filed by the plaintiffs has been rightly held to be barred by time by the learned Trial Judge But, the lower Appellate Court did not, as mentioned earlier, go into all the aspects of the matter and also did not consider the evidence in proper Perspective and, as such, the finding of the lower Appellate Court as regards the limitation issue cannot be sustained both on facts as well as in law. Accordingly, the first substantial questions of law stands answered.

59. As far as the second question of law is concerned, once the suit item was relinquished in favour of Patel Mallegowda by defendants 3 and 4 under Ex. D. 12, which is a registered document, the acquisition of the suit item by the aforesaid Patel Mallegowda, therefore, can be traced to the right which Patel Mallegowda got under the registered deed and, as such, the suit property continued to remain as joint family property does not arise. The second question of law, therefore, stands answered accordingly.

60. In the light of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower Appellate Court cannot be sustained in law and that of the Trial Court needs to be restored and hence, I pass the following order: The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court stands restored. No costs.


SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - LIMITATION ACT - LAND REFORMS ACT - EXPLAINED BY JUSTICE K.L.MANJUNATH AND JUSTICE B.V.NAGARATHNA


SYED ZAHEER   VS. C.V. SIDDAVEERAPPA DECIDED ON DEC 18 2009  REPORTED IN   ILR 2010 KAR 765,   HON’BLE JUSTICES:  K.L. MANJUNATH AND B.V. NAGARATHNA,

WHEN NO TIME IS FIXED UNDER CONTRACT AND SORROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES TO DECIDE CAUSE OF ACTION:-

Article 54 of the Limitation Act specifies two points of time from which time begins to run for the purpose of computing the period of three years limitation with regard to filing suits for specific performance of contract. One, is the date fixed for the performance of the contract and two, if no such date Is fixed then when the plaintiff has notice of the performance being refused. Much reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ahamed Saheb Abidulla Mulla v. Bibijan reported in (2009) 5 SCC 462, by the counsel for the appellants to contend that in the instant case, the suit filed for specific performance was beyond the prescribed period of limitation and therefore, the suit filed by the respondent herein was not maintainable by placing reliance on the second limb of Article 54 of the limitation Act. While considering time from which period begins to run under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision held that 'fixed' used in the said article in essence means having final or crystallized form or not stopped to change or fluctuation and the inevitable conclusion is that the expression "date fixed for the performance" is a crystallized notion which is clear from the fact that the second part of Article 54 states "time from which period begins to run" which refers to a case where no such date is fixed. In other words, the Apex Court held that when date is fixed, it means that there is a definite date fixed for doing a particular act and when there is no date fixed then when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused is also a definite point of time when the plaintiff notices the refusal and in that sense both the particulars refer to definite dates. The same has been relied upon to contend that in the instant case the legal notice was issued by the appellants in the year 1995 with regard to refusal to perform the contract, In as much as it was stated that the agreement was unenforceable on account of non-alienation clause, but the suit has been filed only in the year 1999. The facts of the present case have to be considered in the light of the decision of the Apex Court. It is seen that the land grant which Is the subject matter of the agreement in question was made in the year 1983 and there was a fifteen year period of non-alienation which would have come to an end only In the year 1998. However, three years prior to that date i.e., in the year 1995 Itself legal notice was sent to the respondent stating that on account of the non-alienation clause, the contract could not be performed by the appellants on account of permission not been obtained from the concerned authority by them. At that point of time there were still three more years for the non-alienation period to come to an end and therefore, it was premature on the part of the appellants to contend that in the year 1995 itself that on account of the non-alienation clause the contract could not be performed on account of permission not being obtained. However, a declaration with regard to unenforceability of the contract was sought by the appellants by filing a suit in the year 1995 itself. But, what has to be noticed is the fact that on account of the non-alienation clause it was specifically mentioned in the contract that the sale deed would be registered only after coming to an end of the non-alienation period, which would have been in the year 1998. Therefore, until the non-alienation period came to an end the respondent also could not have asked for performance of the contract by the appellants. Only after the end of the non-alienation period i.e., in the year 1998 the cause of action to seek specific performance of the contract arose for the respondent.


WHEN A PARTY IS IMPLEADED : DATE OF IMPLEADING HIM AS PARTY DATES BACK TO FILING OF SUIT IF COURT IS SATISFIED IN THAT BEHALF:-

The case of Ganapathy (Padala) Suryakumari v. Dr. Erra Reddy and Anr. reported in AIR 2007 AP 118 has been cited to contend that if a party is added subsequently as a plaintiff or a defendant in the suit as far as that party is concerned, the date of institution of suit would be reckoned as the date on which the order allowing the impleadment is passed by the court and that in the instant case, 5th appellant was arrayed as fifth defendant by the respondent herein after the institution of the suit and that the suit was barred by limitation as against her. However, the said position of law is not correct in view of proviso to Section 21 of the Limitation Act which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Munshi Ram v. Narsi Ram and Anr., AIR 1983 SC 271, wherein it has been held that if the court is satisfied with the omission to include a new plaintiff or a defendant was due to a mistake or the mistake was made in good faith it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant should be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date. The said proviso is inserted to take care of the case of omission to implead a person due to to be a bonafide mistake which should not deprive the plaintiff of his rights against the person if the court is satisfied in that behalf.



PERMISSION OF AUTHORITIES IS NO BAR TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE DECREE:-

In this context it would be of relevance to refer to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ranjibhai v. Narotham Das reported in AIR 1986 SC 1912. In the said case there was an agreement for sale of flat which had to be finalized after obtaining permission of authorities to use as village site was a pre-condition for the execution of the sale deed. The suit for specific performance was filed within three years after obtaining permission, it was held to be not barred by limitation. The said decision is applicable to the facts of the present case also. Consequently, the other decisions which have been cited by the learned Counsel for the appellants namely ILR 1992 Karnataka 429 and ILR 1992 Karnataka 644 are not applicable to the facts of the present case.  


Gahesa Naicken v. Arumugha Naicken AIR 1954 Mad 811 has been cited to contend that where the darkhast grant was in the nature of a gift by the Government with a specific provision that the property shall not be alienated without the consent of the Tahsildar, any contract which has the effect of circumventing this policy of the Government would be opposed to public policy and the agreement to sell the property would be void. The said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case since the sale agreement had to be executed by the appellants after the period of non-alienation and it is only on the lapse of the said period that the respondent filed the suit for specific performance. Similarly, the decision in Ramachandraiah v. Nagappa Naidu, ILR 1995 Kar 570 is also not applicable.


Pujari Narasappa and Anr. v. Shaik Hazrat and Ors. AIR 1960 Mys 59 has been cited on behalf of the appellant to contend that where permission of the collector is a condition precedent for alienation under the Act and the plaintiffs sought before the Civil Court specific performance of the agreement to sell and if the said suit is decreed, it would defeat the pre-condition of obtaining permission which would be in contravention of the grant or law regarding alienation of such grant and Section 23 of the Contract Act and would be a bar to such a suit. However, another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Yogambika v. Narsingh, ILR 1992 Kar 717 has held that even in the presence of a period of non-alienation clause for ten years in a document of allotment is not a bar to decree a suit for specific performance as the object of the law is to enforce contract which is applicable to the facts of the present case.


In the case of Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corporation Put Ltd. and Ors., AIR 2002 SC 2290 it has been held that when the construction company refused construction on the ground that the original lease of plot was terminated by the municipality and the facts showed that there was a possibility of renewal of lease and revalidation of building plan and the purchaser was ready to perform her part of the contract, then specific performance cannot be refused. The said decision is applicable to the facts of the present case.


In the case of Andanur Rajashekar v. Vasavi Industrial Enterprises and Ors. AIR 2007 Kar 497 this Court considered Section 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act in the context of Section 23 of the Contract Act and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act and held that what is prohibited under Section 80 is a non-agriculturist purchasing agricultural land and if a permission can be obtained from the statutory authority, then proviso to Section 80 would not be a bar. It was also stated that Section 80 did not bar an agreement to sell agricultural land to a non-agriculturist, but what is prohibited is a sale. The said decision is in fact applicable to the facts of the present case as no sale has taken place in contravention of the terms of the grant in the instant case and the agreement of sale specifically mentions that the sale deed would be executed after the period of non-alienation is completed. Therefore, the agreement in question cannot be held to be null and void or hit by Section 23 of the contract. To the same effect is the decision in another decision of this Court in the case of Ningappa Durgappa v. Hanumantappa Balappa and Anr. L.J. 1982(1) 419. In fact even in the case of Manasa Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Marikellaiah and Ors. AIR 2006 Kant 273 it has been held that the mere filing of a suit for specific performance of contract for grant of a decree in the same would not amount to violation of Section 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and that the said Section will not create any bar in the Civil Court to decide whether the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree for specific performance or not.



In the case of Balu Babu Rao v. Shaik Akbar, AIR 2001 Bombay 364 in the context of Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act it has been held that when the suit property was not transferable, without prior permission of the collector a decree of specific performance granted subject to sanction of collector cannot be held to be improper.


READINESS AND WILLINGNESS INFERRED FROM EVIDENCE:- In Manzoor Ahmed Magray v. Gulam Hassan Aram and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 191 it is held that readiness and willingness can be inferred from evidence led by the parties and if there is no delay on the part of the plaintiff, equitable relief cannot be denied.



DISCRETIONARY RELIEF OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE EXPLAINED:-

Section 20 of the Act states that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary. It says that the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. Such a discretion, however, is not to be exercised arbitrarily, but must be based on sound and reasonable judicial principles. The Section also specifies the circumstances in which the Court may properly exercise the discretion not to decree specific performance and it also specifies when, in an appropriate case, a decree could be given by proper exercise of discretion.

Section 20 is not an exhaustive provision, but merely illustrative as it is not possible to define the circumstances in which equitable relief could or could not be granted. If, therefore, on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, the Court thinks that it will be inequitable to grant the relief asked for, it should not give the relief. In this context, it is necessary to refer to explanation to Section 10 of the Act provides that, unless and until the contrary is proved, the Court shall presume that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money. But the said presumption is a rebuttable presumption.

Sub-section (2) of Section 20 specifies certain circumstances when discretion may be exercised not to decree specific performance. These circumstances are illustrative and they can be defined as follows:
(i) when the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into contract or the circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that they give the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant.

(ii) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship to the defendant whereas, its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff.

(iii) that it makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.


While explaining these circumstances,
Explanation-I speaks about unfair disadvantage.
Explanation-II relates to hardship which is a circumstance in favour of the defendant, while Explanations-Ill and IV are in favour of the plaintiff when in a case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance or refused specific performance, merely because the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the defendant.


The decision of the Supreme Court in the case Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew v. Nedumbara Kuruvila's Son and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2328 is relied upon by the respondent to contend that it is the duty of the Court to see that litigation is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, stated that Section 20 preserves judicial discretion to Courts as to decreeing specific performance. The Court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case and the Court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict.


In 1999(3) Kar.L.J. 677 (Y.N. Gopala RAO v. D.R. Laxminarayana and Ors.) it has been held by this Court that the presumption in a suit for specific performance is that a breach of contract cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money and that contract can be satisfied only by conveyance of particular estate contracted for sale and the said presumption is rebuttable, and the burden of rebutting is on the party opposing enforcement of contract and where such party has failed to rebut presumption, suit for specific performance is to be decreed against such party. This principle is also stated in Explanation (i) to Sub-section (b) of Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act.

While adverting to Section 20 of the Act, it is stated in this decision that rise in price is no ground to refuse specific performance and the refusal may also have tendency to cause hardship in the plaintiff in acquiring such property or other property at such time.

In AIR 2004 SC 909 (M.S. Madhusoodhanan and Anr. v. Kerala Kaumudi Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.) it is observed that the guidelines for the exercise of the Court's discretion to decree specific performance of an agreement have been statutorily laid down in Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act and that, in Explanation 1 to Section 20, it is stated that mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of Clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of Clause (b).


ILR 1992 Kar 717 (Yogambika v. Narsingh) is relied upon by the respondent to contend that the mere fact that a person is a retired Government servant cannot at all be considered to be a valid ground to refuse to enforce the contract he had voluntarily agreed to and that, under Section 20 of the Act, the grounds which enable the Court to refuse to grant a decree must be such which were not in the contemplation of the parties when they entered into an agreement of sale and also that the defendant had no control over those grounds and as a result of those grounds, it has become impossible for him to get on without the property agreed to be sold.







NEWS PAPER PUBLICATION GUDELINES BY SUPREME COURT JUSTICE R.V.RAVEENDRAN AND H.L.GOKHALE

In Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition C.M.D.A. Vs. J. Sivaprakasam and Ors. – Decided on Nov 18 2010 Hon’ble Judges of Supreme court : Justice R.V. Raveendran and Justice H.L. Gokhale, in Civil Appeal No. 9740 of 2010, discussed the mode of publication of preliminary notification in news papers.
The controversy in this case relates to the second mode, that is publication in "two daily newspapers circulating in that locality". The provision does not use the words "two daily newspapers having a wide circulation in the locality". In the absence of any definition or explanation in the Statute, the question is as to how should the words circulating in that locality' be understood? Do they refer to newspapers having the widest circulation in the locality? Or do they refer to newspapers which are regularly sold or circulated in the locality, irrespective of numbers, even if their circulation figures are very modest? If there are nine newspapers circulating in the locality, having a market share of 25%, 20%, 15%, 12%, 10%, 8%, 5%, 3% and 2% of the total daily sales of regional newspapers in the locality, whether all of them can be termed as newspapers circulating in the locality' or whether only newspapers with a particular minimum percentage can be described as newspapers circulating in the locality'. Can it be said that the newspapers having 5%, 3% and 2% of total sales of newspapers, are not newspapers circulating in the locality? Can it be said that only the newspapers having the maximum market share of 25% or 20% or 15% of the total sales in the locality, could be described as newspapers circulating in the locality? Whether the total circulation figures of the newspaper are relevant or whether the circulation figures in the locality alone are relevant? From a newspaper's point of view, if its total circulation is 40,000 and out of it circulation figure for Chennai is 21,000, it can very well say that it's major circulation is in Chennai. But from the reader's point of view, if the total number of regional newspapers sold in Chennai is a million, a newspaper having a circulation of 21,000 (which is around 2%) may not be considered to be a newspaper with a wide circulation in the locality. Which perspective should be preferred? If section 4(1) is to be interpreted as requiring publication in two newspapers having reasonably wide circulation, as held by the High Court, what should be the guidelines to determine reasonably wide circulation'? Where should the line be drawn and whether any line should be drawn are questions that may arise, if we read the words newspapers circulating in that locality' as newspapers having wide circulation in that locality'………….The purpose of publication of the notification is two fold: First is to ensure that adequate publicity is given so that land owners and persons interested will have an opportunity to file their objections under Section 5A of the Act. Second is to put the land owners/occupants on notice that government officers will be entering upon the property for carrying on the activities enumerated in section 4(2) of the Act. Section 4(1), before its amendment in 1984, required publication of the preliminary notification only in the official gazette and public notice, of the substance of the notification at convenient places in the locality. This Court, in Madhya Pradesh Housing Board vs. Mohd Shafi and Ors. 1992 (2) SCC 168 explained the object of issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Act thus: "The object of issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Act is two- fold. First, it is a public announcement by the Government and a public notice by the Collector to the effect that the land, as specified therein, is needed or is likely to he needed by the Government for the "public purpose" mentioned therein; and secondly, it authorizes the departmental officers or officers of the local authority, as the case may be to do all such acts as are mentioned in Section 4(2) of the Act. The notification has to be published in the locality and particularly persons likely to be affected by the proposal have to be put on notice that such an activity is afoot. The notification is, thus, required to give with sufficient clarity not only the "public purpose" for which the acquisition proceedings are being commenced but also the "locality" where the land is situate with as full a description as possible of the land proposed to be acquired to enable the "interested" persons to know as to which land is being acquired and for what purpose and to take further steps under the Act by filing objections etc., since it is open to such persons to canvass the non-suitability of the land for the alleged "public purpose" also. If a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is defective and does not comply with the requirements of the Act, it not only vitiates the notification, but also renders all subsequent proceedings connected with the acquisition, bad."…………By Amendment Act 68 of 1984, section 4(1) was amended introducing the additional requirement relating to publication of the notification in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality. The purpose of requiring such newspaper publication is to give as wide a publicity to the notification as possible, as the State Gazettes do not have a wide circulation and causing public notice of the substance of the notification at convenient places in the locality would give notice only in specific pockets in the locality. Legislature therefore provided for publication in two newspapers (of which at least one being in the regional language) to have a wider reach. Having regard to the object and purpose of the provision, it is evident that publication should be in newspapers which have a reasonably good circulation in the locality. If the publication is to be made in obscure newspapers having only token or insignificant circulation, either to cut the cost of publication or by way of political or official patronage, that will defeat the very purpose of providing for publication in newspapers………………On the other hand, if the words newspapers circulating in that locality' are to be interpreted in a purely literal and normal sense, they would mean newspapers having a regular and steady circulation among the general public in the locality, irrespective of the number. In that sense even a newspaper having 2% to 3% market share out of the total circulation figures for regional newspapers sold in the locality, can be considered as a newspaper "circulating in the locality". Therefore, where there is compliance with the requirement relating to publication in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality (one which at least should be in the regional language) in a technical or literal sense, but it is found that those newspapers have only a circulation share of 2% to 3% of the total number of newspaper sold in the locality, it may not be possible to mechanically invalidate the entire acquisition, on the ground that the two regional newspapers in which the notification was published were not "circulating in that locality"………………..We have held that the object and purpose of the amended section 4(1) of the Act is to provide for publication of the preliminary notification in two daily newspapers having reasonably wide circulation in the locality so that people (persons interested) in that locality may become aware of the proposals for acquisition. We have also held that publications in two newspapers having regular and steady circulation, but having a market share of only 2% to 3% of the total newspapers can not invalidate the acquisition proceedings automatically, on the ground that such publication violates the requirement of section 4(1) relating to newspaper publication. As the said two findings are slightly contradictory, it is necessary to harmonize the consequences……………………This leads us next to the consequences of publication of the notification in two newspapers having reasonably wide circulation and consequences of bonafide publication of the notification in two newspapers which do not have a wide circulation in the locality……………………If there is failure to publish in two daily newspapers or if the publication is in two newspapers that have no circulation at all in the locality, without anything more, the notification under section 4(1) of the Act and the consequential acquisition proceedings will be vitiated, on the ground of non-compliance with an essential condition of section 4(1) of the Act…………………………….If the two newspapers carrying the publication of the notification have reasonably wide circulation in the locality, (apart from the publication of the notification in the Gazette and causing public notice of the substance of the notification to be given at convenient places in the locality), then the requirements of section 4(1) are complied with and all persons concerned in the locality shall be deemed to have notice of the notification. (For this purpose, the publication need not be in newspapers having the widest or largest circulation, but it is sufficient if the publication is in newspapers having reasonably wide circulation). In that event, neither the notification under section 4(1), nor the consequential acquisition proceedings would be open to challenge, on the ground of violation of Section 4 of the Act………………………..If the newspapers in which the notification is published were circulating in the locality, but did not have a reasonably wide circulation in the locality, then neither the notification under section 4(1) nor the consequential acquisition proceedings, will become vitiated automatically. If the person aggrieved, apart from demonstrating that the two newspapers did not have reasonably wide circulation in the locality, also asserts that as a consequence, he did not have notice of the proposed acquisition that was provided for in Section 4(1) of the Act, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the acquisition to the extent of the land of such person will be vitiated. But if such assertion is rebutted by the acquiring authority by placing evidence to show that the person concerned had in fact notice (as for example where he participated in the enquiry under section 5A of the Act), the acquisition will not be vitiated on the ground of violation of section 4A of the Act…………………………..If the person challenging the acquisition is able to establish that the notifications were deliberately and with malafides, published in newspapers having negligible circulation, to avoid notice to the persons concerned, then section 4(1) will be violated. …………………………………. To avoid such unnecessary controversies and litigation, acquiring authorities should ensure that the notification under section 4(1) of the Act is published in the newspapers having reasonable wide circulation.

KHARAB LAND AND CONVERSION CLARIFIED BY JUSTICE ANAND BYRAREDDY

L. A. Krishnappa Vs. State of Karnataka and Others 2009 (2) KarLJ 697 Date of Judgement: 23/01/2009 Honourable Judges: Anand Byrareddy, J. The Counsel would place reliance on the judgments of this Court in P. Bhimachar v State of Mysore and Others, 1966(2) Mys. L.J. 184 (DB), wherein a Division Bench of this Court has held that pot kharab portion of the land is included in the ownership of the occupant. A similar view is taken in Saudagar Rasul Khan v State of Mysore and Others, ILR 1973 Kar. 56, wherein it is held that kharab land is so-called because it is not cultivable and is a classification made for the purposes of revenue exemption. Rule 21(2)(a) is thus a provision relating to the exemption from the payment of land revenue and has no relevance for assuming that the pot kharab portion is land not included in the occupancy, and that it belongs to the Government. From this point of view also the demand made for the payment of the market value on the pot kharab is unauthorised.


While the Government Pleader on the other hand, would seek to justify the action of the State Government on the basis of the circulars namely Circular No. RD 136 LGS 93, dated 16-9-1994 as well as the Circular No. RD 137 LQW 2001, dated 17-6-2003 whereunder an opinion of the law department is expressed to the effect that kharab lands are Government lands and therefore, the question of acquiring those lands does not arise and hence, there is no scope for making any payments to the landlords in respect of kharab land. Reliance is also placed on a circular dated 12-5-2004, wherein it is clarified that if 'A' kharab land if granted by the Competent Authority, it would only then become part and parcel of Hiduvali land of the landlord. It is contended by the Government Pleader that the ownership of "A" kharab land always vests with the Government unless it is granted to the landowner by the Competent Authority. And therefore, would submit that the demand made is in order.


It is not in dispute that in the present circumstances, the demand made is in respect of pot kharab(a) land. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, there is no distinction made between an arable portion of land and an unarable portion of land under Rule 107 for purposes of levy of fine for conversion of land for non-agricultural use. The reliance sought to be placed by the State on the circulars which are mere clarifications based on the opinions expressed by its law department would not override the express provisions of law, which have been referred to herein above. There is no indication that there is a distinction between an arable portion of land and unarable portion of land. The provisions of Section 95 relating to conversion of agricultural land for other purposes does not also make any such distinction. Hence, the State Government seeking to interpret the provisions in order to obtain higher revenue would not be tenable. It is only in respect of pot kharab(b) lands, it could be said that the State Government can claim the same as Government lands. Insofar as pot kharab(a) lands are concerned, the Division Bench decision referred to above is categorical on this aspect and that has attained finality. There is no other manner in which the provisions could be interpreted.

PRESUMPTION IN PTCL CASES

In a decision of High court of Karnataka in case of S. Venkata Reddy Vs. Mulabagalappa and Others Reported in 2009 (3) KarLJ 294 Decided by Justice Arali Nagaraj, J. Date of Judgement: 28/01/2009 Regular Second Appeal No. 929 of 2002, It is observed that "It is not in dispute that the said land was granted to Mulabagalappa for the reason that he happened to be a member of scheduled caste. Therefore, the mortgage of the said land by the defendant-grantee in favour of the plaintiff authorising the plaintiff to enjoy usufructs was clearly in violation of the provisions of Section 4 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978.

It is held by this Court in the case of R.H. Ramakrishnaiah v The Deputy Commissioner, Shimoga District and Others, 2000(2) Kar. L.J. Sh. N. 21, that usufructuary mortgage of the granted land amounts to transfer and if such transfer is without the previous permission of the State Government, it is null and void and mortgagee is liable to be evicted and the land has to be resumed by the Government for restoration to the grantee.

Therefore, following this decision, since the plaintiff transferee acquired the said land and mango trees by way of the said transfer made in his favour by the defendant without the permission of the Government, the said transfer shall have to be held 'null and void' conveying no right, title or interest in such land by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. ……………………. Further, Section 5(3) provides that where any granted land is in the possession of a person other than the original grantee or his legal heir it shall be presumed, until contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by transfer which is 'null and void' under the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978. This being so, the burden is heavy on the plaintiff to prove that the said mortgage was not obtained by him in contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978."

CASE LAW ON LAND LAWS

KARNATAKA LAND LAWS