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SUB-LETTING OF TENANCY

In the case of Associated Hotels of India Ltd., Delhi v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh AIR 1968 SC 933, this Court held that when eviction is sought on the ground of subletting, the onus to prove subletting is on the landlord. It was further held that if the landlord prima facie shows that the third party is in exclusive possession of the premises let out for valuable consideration, it would then be for the tenant to rebut the evidence.

In Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri & Others (1987) 3 SCC 538, this Court held that in a case where a tenant becomes a partner of a partnership firm and allows the firm to carry on business in the demised premises while he himself retains legal possession thereof, the act of the landlord does not amount to subletting. It was held that whether there is genuine partnership or not must be judged in the facts of each case in the light of the principles applicable to partnership.

Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma[(1988) 1 SCC 70] where it was held that to constitute a sub-letting, there must be a parting of legal possession, i.e., possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others and whether in a particular case there was sub-letting was substantially a question of fact.

A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam and Others (2004) 4 SCC 794 "The rent control legislations which extend many a protection to the tenant, also provide for grounds of eviction. One such ground, most common in all the legislations, is sub-letting or parting with possession of the tenancy premises by the tenant. Rent control laws usually protect the tenant so long as he may himself use the premises but not his transferee inducted into possession of the premises, in breach of the contract or the law, which act is often done with the object of illegitimate profiteering or rack-renting. To defeat the provisions of law, a device is at times adopted by unscrupulous tenants and sub-tenants of bringing into existence a deed of partnership which gives the relationship of tenant and sub-tenant an outward appearance of partnership while in effect what has come into existence is a sub-tenancy or parting with possession camouflaged under the cloak of partnership. Merely because a tenant has entered into a partnership he cannot necessarily be held to have sub-let the premises or parted with possession thereof in favour of his partners. If the tenant is actively associated with the partnership business and retains the use and control over the tenancy premises with him, maybe along with the partners, the tenant may not be said to have parted with possession. However, if the user and control of the tenancy premises has been parted with and deed of partnership has been drawn up as an indirect method of collecting the consideration for creation of sub-tenancy or for providing a cloak or cover to conceal a transaction not permitted by law, the court is not estopped from tearing the veil of partnership and finding out the real nature of transaction entered into between the tenant and the alleged sub-tenant. A person having secured a lease of premises for the purpose of his business may be in need of capital or finance or someone to assist him in his business and to achieve such like purpose he may enter into partnership with strangers. Quite often partnership is entered into between the members of any family as a part of tax planning. There is no stranger brought on the premises. So long as the premises remain in occupation of the tenant or in his control, a mere entering into partnership may not provide a ground for eviction by running into conflict with prohibition against 1 sub-letting or parting with possession. This is a general statement of law which ought to be read in the light of the lease agreement and the law governing the tenancy. There are cases wherein the tenant sub-lets the premises or parts with possession in defiance of the terms of lease or the rent control legislation and in order to save himself from the peril of eviction brings into existence, a deed of partnership between him and his sub-lessee to act as a cloak on the reality of the transaction. The existence of deed of partnership between the tenant and the alleged sub-tenant would not preclude the landlord from bringing on record material and circumstances, by adducing evidence or by means of cross-examination, making out a case of sub- letting or parting with possession or interest in tenancy premises by the tenant in favour of a third person. The rule as to exclusion of oral by documentary evidence governs the parties to the deed in writing. A stranger to the document is not bound by the terms of the document and is, therefore, not excluded from demonstrating the untrue or collusive nature of the document or the fraudulent or illegal purpose for which it was brought into being. An enquiry into reality of transaction is not excluded merely by availability of writing reciting the transaction........."

In Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam 1 [(2004) 4 SCC 794] a three-Judge Bench of this Court devised the test in these terms: (SCC p. 799, para 8) "If the tenant is actively associated with the partnership business and retains the use and control over the tenancy premises with him, maybe along with the partners, the tenant may not be said to have parted with possession. However, if the user and control of the tenancy premises has been parted with and deed of partnership has been drawn up as an indirect method of collecting the consideration for creation of sub-tenancy or for providing a cloak or cover to conceal a transaction not permitted by law, the court is not estopped from tearing the veil of partnership and finding out the real nature of transaction entered into between the tenant and the alleged sub- tenant"."

Ms. Celina Coelho Pereira & Ors. Vs Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar & Ors. JUSTICE Tarun Chatterjee & JUSTICE R. M. Lodha DD 30-10-2009, The legal position was quoted by the court after discussing several decisions and summarised as follows:

(i) In order to prove mischief of subletting as a ground for eviction under rent control laws, two ingredients have to be established, (one) parting with possession of tenancy or part of it by tenant in favour of a third party with exclusive right of possession and (two) that such parting with possession has been done without the consent of the landlord and in lieu of compensation or rent.

(ii) Inducting a partner or partners in the business or profession by a tenant by itself does not amount to subletting. However, if the purpose of such partnership is ostensible and a deed of partnership is drawn to conceal the real transaction of sub-letting, the court may tear the veil of partnership to find out the real nature of transaction entered into by the tenant.

(iii) The existence of deed of partnership between tenant and alleged sub-tenant or ostensible transaction in any other form would not preclude the landlord from bringing on record material and circumstances, by adducing evidence or by means of cross-examination, making out a case of sub-letting or parting with possession in tenancy premises by the tenant in favour of a third person.

(iv) If tenant is actively associated with the partnership business and retains the control over the tenancy premises with him, may be along with partners, the tenant may not be said to have parted with possession.
(v) Initial burden of proving subletting is on landlord but once he is able to establish that a third party is in exclusive possession of the premises and that tenant has no legal possession of the tenanted premises, the onus shifts to tenant to prove the nature of occupation of such third party and that he (tenant) continues to hold legal possession in tenancy premises.

(vi) In other words, initial burden lying on landlord would stand discharged by adducing prima facie proof of the fact that a party other than tenant was in exclusive possession of the premises. A presumption of sub-letting may then be raised and would amount to proof unless rebutted.




GIFT OF UNDIVIDED CO-PARCENARY PROPERTY VOID

In Thamma Venkata Subbamma (dead) by Lrs. V. Thamma Rattamma and Others (1987 (3) SCC 294) it was observed as follows: "There is a long catena of decisions holding that a gift by a coparcener of his undivided interest in the coparcenary property is void. It is not necessary to refer to all these decisions Instead, we may refer to the following statement of law in Mayne's Hindu Law, eleventh Edn., Article 382: "It is now equally well settled in all the Provinces that a gift or devise by a coparcener in a Mitakshara family of his undivided interest is wholly invalid....A coparcener cannot make a gift of his undivided interest in the family property, movable or immovable, either to a stranger or to a relative except for purposes warranted by special texts. …………We may also refer to a passage from Mulla's Hindu Law, fifteenth edn., Article 258, which is as follows: Gift of undivided interest. - (1) According to the Mitakshara law as applied in all the States, no coparcener can dispose of his undivided interest in coparcenary property by gift. Such transaction being void altogether there is no estoppel or other kind of personal bar which precludes the donor from asserting his right to recover the transferred property. He may, however, make a gift of his interest with the consent of the other coparceners.

2008(11 )SCR904 Baljinder Singh . Vs Rattan Singh It is, however, a settled law that a coparcenary can make a gift of his undivided interest in the coparcenary property to another coparcener or to a stranger with the prior consent of all other coparceners. Such a gift would be quite legal and valid

In Sunil Kumar and Anr. v. Ram Parkash and Ors. (AIR 1988 SC 576) it was noted in paras 23 and 24 as follows: The managing member or karta has not only the power to manage but also power to alienate joint family property. The alienation may be either for family necessity or for the benefit of the estate. Such alienation would bind the interests of all the undivided members of the family whether they are adults or minors. The oft quoted decision in this aspect, is that of the Privy Council in Hanuman Parshad v. Mt. Babooee, [1856] 6 M.I.A. 393. There it was observed at p. 423: (1) "The power of the manager for an infant heir to charge an estate not his own is, under the Hindu law, a limited and qualified power. It can only be exercised rightly in case of need, or for the benefit of the estate." This case was that of a mother, managing as guardian for an infant heir. A father who happens to be the manager of an undivided Hindu family certainly has greater powers to which I will refer a little later. Any other manager however, is not having anything less than those stated in the said case. Therefore, it has been repeatedly held that the principles laid down in that case apply equally to a father or. other coparcener who manages the joint family estate.. Although the power of disposition of joint family property has been conceded to the manager of joint Hindu family for the reasons aforesaid, the law raises no presumption as to the validity of his transactions. His acts could be questioned in the Court of law. The other members of the family have a right to have the transaction declared void, if not justified. When an alienation is challenged as being unjustified or illegal it would be for the alienee to prove that there was legal necessity in fact or that he made proper and bona fide enquiry as to the existence of such necessity. It would be for the alienee to prove that he did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of such necessity. If the alienation is found to be unjustified, then it would be declared void. Such alienations would be void except to the extent of manager's share in Madras, Bombay and Central Provinces. The purchaser could get only the manager's share. But in other provinces, the purchaser would not get even that much. The entire alienation would be void. [Mayne's Hindu Law 11th ed. para 396].

In Sadasivam v. K. Doraisamy (AIR 1996 SC 1724) it was found that when the father has executed sale deed in favour of a near relative and the intention to repay debt or legal necessity has not been proved as a sham transaction.

In Words and Phrases by Justice R.P. Sethi the expression `void' and `'voidable' read as under: "Void- Black's Law Dictionary gives the meaning of the word "void" as having different nuances in different connotations. One of them is of course "null or having no legal force or binding effect". And the other is "unable in law, to support the purpose for which it was intended". After referring to the nuances between void and voidable the lexicographer 26 pointed out the following: "The word `void' in its strictest sense, means that which has no force and effect, is without legal efficacy, is incapable of being enforced by law, or has no legal or binding force, but frequently the word is used and construed as having the more liberal meaning of `voidable'. The word `void' is used in statute in the sense of utterly void so as to be incapable of ratification, and also in the sense of voidable and resort must be had to the rules of construction in many cases to determine in which sense the legislature intended to use it. An act or contract neither wrong in itself nor against public policy, which has been declared void by statute for the protection or benefit of a certain party, or class of parties, is voidable only". (Pankan Mehra and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2000 (2) SCC 756).

Per Fazal Ali, J- The meaning of the word "void" is stated in Black's Law Dictionary (3rd Edn.) to be as follows: "Null and void; ineffectual; nugatory; having no legal force or binding effect; unable in law to support the purpose for which it was intended; nugatory and ineffectual so that nothing can cure it; not valid". Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay (1951 SCR 228).

The expression "void" has several facets. One type of void acts, transactions, decrees are those which are wholly without jurisdiction, ab initio void and for avoiding the same no declaration is necessary, law does not take any notice of the same and it can be disregarded in collateral proceeding or otherwise. Judicial Review of Administration Action, 5th Edn., para 5-044 (See also Judicial Remedies in Public Law at page 131; Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and Ors. (2001 (6) SCC 534)

The other type of void act, e.g. may be transaction against a minor without being represented by a next friend. Such a transaction is a good transaction against the whole world. So far as the minor is concerned, if he decides to avoid the same and succeeds in avoiding it by taking recourse to appropriate preceding the transaction becomes void from the very beginning. Another type of void act may be one, which is not a nullity, but for avoiding the same, a declaration has to be made. (Government of Orissa v Ashok Transport Agency and Ors (2002 (9) SCC 28)

The meaning to be given to the word "void" in Article 13 of the Constitution is no longer res integra, for the matter stands concluded by the majority decision of the Court in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay (1951) SCR 228. We have to apply the ratio decidendi in that case to the facts of the present case. The impugned Act was a existing law at the time when the Constitution came into force. That existing law imposed on the exercise of the right guaranteed in the citizens of the India by Article 19(1)(g) restrictions which could not be justified as reasonable under clause (6) as it then stood and consequently under Article 13, that existing Law became void "to the extent of such inconsistency". As explained in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case (supra) the Law became void in toto or for all purposes or for all times or for all persons but only "to the extent of such inconsistency", that is to say, to the extent it became inconsistent with the provisions of Part III which conferred the fundamental rights on the citizens.

It did not become void independently of the existence of the rights guaranteed by Part III. (Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. (1955 (2) SCR 589).

The word "void" has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. (Re- issue) Vol. 1(1) in para 26, p.31 it is stated thus: "If an act of decision, or an order or other instrument is invalid, it should, in principle, be null and void for all purposes; and it has been said that there are no degrees of nullity. Even though such an act is wrong and lacking in jurisdiction, however, it subsists and remains fully effective unless and until it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Until its validity is challenged, its legality is preserved". (State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, Naduvil (dead) and ors. (1996 (1) SCC 435).

"Voidable act" is that which is a good act unless avoided, e.g. if a suit is filed for a declaration that a document is fraudulent, it is voidable as the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs and a party who alleges otherwise is oblige to prove it. If it is proved that the document is forged and fabricated and a declaration to that effect is given, a transaction becomes void from the very beginning. There may be voidable transaction which is required to be set aside and the same is avoided from the day it is so set aside and not any day prior to it. In cases, where legal effect of a document cannot be taken away without setting aside the same, it cannot be treated to be void but would be obviously voidable. Government of Orissa v. Ashok Transport Agency and Ors. (2002 (9) SCC 28)".





SUB-REGISTRAR VALUE IS NOT THE BASIS



In Jawajee Nagnatham vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad, A.P. and Others [(1994) 4 SCC 595], the Court observed : "The market value of the land for proper stamp duty has to be determined as per the law under Section 47-A itself. That view was followed by another learned Single Judge in P. Sasidar v. Sub-Registrar It is, therefore, clear that the Basic Valuation Register prepared and maintained for the purpose of collecting stamp duty has no statutory base or force. It cannot form a foundation to determine the market value mentioned thereunder in instrument brought for registration. Equally it would not be a basis to determine the market value under Section 23 of the Act, of the lands acquired in that area or town or the locality or the taluk etc. Evidence of bona fide sales between willing prudent vendor and prudent vendee of the lands acquired or situated near about that land possessing same or similar advantageous features would furnish basis to determine market value."



DEDUCTION TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT CHARGES



Whereas a smaller plot may be within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed preparing a layout plan, carving out roads, leaving open spaces, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers and the hazards of an entrepreneur. Such development charges may range between 20% and 50% of the total price." It was further observed : "The purpose for which acquisition is made is also a relevant factor for determining the market value. In Basavva v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer deduction to the extent of 65% was made towards development charges."

The Court noticed a large number of decisions wherein deductions had been made at different rates varying from 20% to 53%. The Court also noticed an earlier decision of this Court in K.S. Shivadevamma vs. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer [(1996) 2 SCC 62], wherein it was opined : "It is then contended that 53% is not automatic but depends upon the nature of the development and the stage of development. We are inclined to agree with the learned counsel that the extent of deduction depends upon development need in each case. Under the Building Rules 53% of land is required to be left out. This Court has laid as a general rule that for laying the roads and other amenities 33-1/3% is required to be deducted. Where the development has already taken place, appropriate deduction needs to be made. In this case, we do not find any development had taken place as on that date. When we are determining compensation under Section 23(1), as on the date of notification under Section 4(1), we have to consider the situation of the land development, if already made, and other relevant facts as on that date. No doubt, the land possessed potential value, but no development had taken place as on the date. In view of the obligation on the part of the owner to hand over the land to the City Improvement Trust for roads and for other amenities and his requirement to expend money for laying the roads, water supply mains, electricity etc., the deduction of 53% and further deduction towards development charges @ 33-1/3%, as ordered by the High Court, was not illegal."




DETERMINATION OF COMPENSATION IN LAQ MATTERS



In Delhi Development Authority vs. Bali Ram Sharma and Others [(2004) 6 SCC 533], 5% increase in the market value was granted having regard to the fact that the notification in question was issued about five years after the notification involved in the earlier judgment. In Land Acquisition Officer, Kammarapally Village, Nizamabad District, A.P. vs. Nookala Rajamallu and Others [(2003) 12 SCC 334], it was observed : "Where large area is the subject-matter of acquisition, rate at which small plots are sold cannot be said to be a safe criterion" It was further observed: "While determining the market value of the land acquired it has to be correctly determined and paid so that there is neither unjust enrichment on the part of the acquirer nor undue deprivation on the part of the owner. It is an accepted principle as laid down in the case of Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v. Revenue Divisional Officer that the compensation must be determined by reference to the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to receive from the willing purchaser..."

In Lila Ghosh (Smt.) (Dead) Through LR Tapas Chandra Roy vs. State of W.B. [(2004) 9 SCC 337], a Division Bench of the Court has observed that if a plot is large, then there must be depreciation for largeness, as large plots always fetch less than small plots.

In V. Hanumantha Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Land Acquisition Officer & Mandal R. Officer [(2003) 12 SCC 642], the law is stated in the following terms : "It is now a well-established principle of law that the land abutting the national highway will fetch far more higher price than the land lying interior"

It is also well-settled that for the purpose of determining the market value of the acquired lands, the comparable sales method i.e. the lands sought to be compared must be similar in potentiality and nature may be adopted. [ Panna Lal Ghosh and Others vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Others (2004) 1 SCC 467].

It is also trite to state that the market value of agricultural land is lower than that of land suitable for commercial purposes [ Om Prakash (Dead) By LRs. and Others vs. Union of India and Another (2004) 10 SCC 627] .

In Shaji Kuriakose and Another Vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and Others [(2001) 7 SCC 650], the court observed: "It is no doubt true that courts adopt comparable sales method of valuation of land while fixing the market value of the acquired land. While fixing the market value of the acquired land, comparable sales method of valuation is preferred than other methods of valuation of land such as capitalisation of net income method or expert opinion method. Comparable sales method of valuation is preferred because it furnishes the evidence for determination of the market value of the acquired land at which a willing purchaser would pay for the acquired land if it had been sold in the open market at the time of issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act. However, comparable sales method of valuation of land for fixing the market value of the acquired land is not always conclusive. There are certain factors which are required to be fulfilled and on fulfilment of those factors the compensation can be awarded, according to the value of the land reflected in the sales. The factors laid down inter alia are: (1) the sale must be a genuine transaction, (2) that the sale deed must have been executed at the time proximate to the date of issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act, (3) that the land covered by the sale must be in the vicinity of the acquired land, (4) that the land covered by the sales must be similar to the acquired land, and (5) that the size of plot of the land covered by the sales be comparable to the land acquired. If all these factors are satisfied, then there is no reason why the sale value of the land covered by the sales be not given for the acquired land. However, if there is a dissimilarity in regard to locality, shape, site or nature of land between land covered by sales and land acquired, it is open to the court to proportionately reduce the compensation for acquired land than what is reflected in the sales depending upon the disadvantages attached with the acquired land."

The Courts will also have to take into consideration the enormity of the financial implication of enhancement in view of the size of the land acquired for a particular project. In Viluben Jhalejar Contractor case, Supreme Court held : "One of the principles for determination of the amount of compensation for acquisition of land would be the willingness of an informed buyer to offer the price therefor. It is beyond any cavil that the price of the land which a willing and informed buyer would offer would be different in the cases where the owner is in possession and enjoyment of the property and in the cases where he is not. ………. Market value is ordinarily the price the property may fetch in the open market if sold by a willing seller unaffected by the special needs of a particular purchase. Where definite material is not forthcoming either in the shape of sales of similar lands in the neighbourhood at or about the date of notification under Section 4(1) or otherwise, other sale instances as well as other evidences have to be considered. ……………. The amount of compensation cannot be ascertained with mathematical accuracy. A comparable instance has to be identified having regard to the proximity from time angle as well as proximity from situation angle. For determining the market value of the land under acquisition, suitable adjustment has to be made having regard to various positive and negative factors vis-a-vis the land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition. The positive and negative factors are as under:

Positive factors (i) smallness of size (ii) proximity to a road (iii) frontage on a road (iv) nearness to developed area (v) regular shape (vi) level vis-a-vis land under acquisition (vii) special value for an owner of an adjoining property to whom it may have some very special advantage

Negative factors (i) largeness of area (ii) situation in the interior at a distance from the road (iii) narrow strip of land with very small frontage compared to depth (iv) lower level requiring the depressed portion to be filled up (v) remoteness from developed locality (vi) some special disadvantageous factors which would deter a purchaser





ACQUISITION AGAINST CDP PLANS

In the case of Munshi Singh and Ors. v. Union of India, in the earlier notification it was mentioned that the Governor of Uttar Pradesh was pleased to notify for general information that the land mentioned in the schedule is likely to be needed for a public purpose. Their Lordship held that owing to the vagueness and indefiniteness of the public purpose stated in the notifications under Section 4(1) and in the absence of any proof that the appellants were either aware of or were shown the scheme or the Master Plan in respect of the planned development of the area in question the appellants were wholly unable to object effectively and exercise their right under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act.


H.G. Sheela vs State Of Karnataka And Ors. Decided on 24/1/2006 ORDERED by Justice V. Gopala Gowda, J. “Before parting with the judgment, it is felt that some observation has to be made so that the future action of the officers shall be in accordance with the provisions of statutory enactments with proper application of mind to the relevant aspects. It is to be noted that when some area is earmarked for residential or other purposes in the CDP, the Board or any other authority cannot make use of such area to other purposes. If that is done, the very object and purpose of preparing the CDP is defeated. In other words, the areas earmarked by the Planning Authority in the CDP remains as such but practically the said areas are permitted to be used for some other purpose by other authorities without revising the CDP. That is wholly impermissible in law.”

IMPROPER EXERCISE OF STATUTORY POWERS

In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1966] 1 S.C.R. 708, it was laid down that the Courts had always acted to restrain a misuse of statutory power and more readily when improper motives underlie it. Exercise of power for collateral purpose has similarly been held to be a sufficient reason to strike down the action. In State of Punjab v. Ramjilal & Ors., [1971] 2 S.C.R. 550, it was held that it was not necessary that any named officer was responsible for the act where the validity of action taken by a Government was challenged as mala fide as it may not be known to a private person as to what matters were considered and placed before the final authority and who had acted on behalf of the Government in passing the order. This does not mean that vague allegations of mala fide are enough to dislodge the burden resting on the person who makes the same a though what is required in this connection is not a proof to the hilt as held in Barium Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. v. Company Law Board, [1966] Supp. S.C.R. 311, the abuse of authority must appear to be reasonably probable.

FRAUDULENT EXCERCISE OF POWER BY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

. Professor de Smith in his monumental work the Judicial Review of Administration Action, 4th edition at pp.335-36 says in his own terse language : "The concept of bad faith eludes precise definition, but in relation to the exercise of statutory powers it h may be said to comprise dishonesty (or fraud) and malice. A power is exercised fraudulently if its repository intends to achieve an object other than that for which he believes the power to have been conferred...... A power is exercised maliciously if its repository is motivated by personal animosity towards those who are directly affected by its exercise. He then goes on to observe : "If the Court concludes that the discretionary power has been used for an unauthorized purpose it is generally immaterial whether its repository was acting in good or bad faith. But there will undoubtedly remain areas of administration where the subject matter of the power and the evident width of the discretion reposed in the decision maker render its exercise almost wholly beyond the reach of judicial review. In these cases the courts have still asserted jurisdiction to determine whether the authority has endeavoured to act in good faith in accordance with the prescribed purpose. In most instances the reservation for the case of bad faith is hardly more than a formality. But when it can be established, the courts will be prepared to set aside a judgment or order procured or made fraudulently despite the existence of a generally worded formula purporting to exclude judicial review. Bad faith is here understood by the learned author to mean intentional usurpation of, power motivated by considerations that are incompatible with the discharge of public responsibility. In requiring statutory powers to be exercised reasonably, in good faith, and on correct grounds, the Courts are still working within the bounds of the familiar principle of ultra vires. The Court assumes that Parliament cannot have intended to authorize unreasonable action which is therefore ultra vires and void. This is the express basis of the reasoning in many well-known cases, on the subject. A necessary corollary is that, as usual throughout administrative law, we are concerned only with acts of legal power i.e. acts which, if valid, themselves produce legal consequence. In general, however, the Courts adhere firmly to the wide meaning of 'jurisdiction' since this is the sheet- anchor of their power to correct abuses. They appear to be willing to stretch the doctrine of ultra vires to cover virtually all situations where statutory power is exercised contrary to some legal principles. There are many cases in which a public authority is held to have acted for improper motives or irrelevant considerations, or have failed to take account of relevant considerations, that its action is ultra vires and void.


The misuse in bad faith arises when the power is exercised for an improper motive, say, to satisfy a private or personal grudge or for wreaking vengeance of a Minister as in S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, [1964] 4 S.C.R. 733. A power is exercised maliciously if its repository is motivated by personal Animosity towards those who are directly affected by its exercise. Use of a power for an 'alien' purpose other than the one for which the power is conferred in mala fide use of that power. Same is the position when an order is made for a purpose other than that which finds place in the order. The ulterior or alien purpose clearly speaks of the misuse of the power and it was observed as early as in 1904 by Lord Lindley in General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtown, L.R. [1904] A.C. 515, 'that there is a condition implied in this as well as in other instruments which create powers, namely, that the powers shall be used bona fide for the purpose for which they are conferred'. It was said that Warrington, C.J., in Short v. Poole Corporation, L.R. [1926] Ch. D.66, that : "No public body can be regarded as having statutory authority to act in bad faith or from corrupt motives, and any action purporting to be of that body, but proved to be committed in bad faith or from corrupt motives, would certainly be held to be inoperative. In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, [1956] 1 Q.B. 702 at pp.712-13, Lord Denning, LJ. said : "No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. See also, in L Lazarus case at p.722 per Lord Parker, CJ : "'Fraud' vitiates all transactions known to the law of however high a degree of solemnity. All these three English decisions have been cited with approval by Supreme Court of India in Partap Singh's case.

PUBLIC AUTHORITIESS SHOULD SHOW UNDER WHICH PROVISION THEY ARE ACTING

Wazir Chand v. State of H.P., [1955] 1 S.C.R. 408, where it was held that the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts, and to Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi v. State of Bihar, [1953] S.C.R. 1129, where the Court said that nothing is more likely to drain the vitality from the rule of law than legislation which singles out a particular individual from his fellow subjects and visits him with a disability which is not imposed upon the others, and concluded : "We have here a highly discriminatory and autocratic act which deprives a person of the possession of property without reference to any law or legal authority. Even if the property was trust property it is difficult to see how the Municipal Committee, Barnala, can step in as trustee on an executive determination only.

ACQUISITION WHEN POLITICALLY MOTIVATED

. STATE OF PUNJAB Vs. GURDIAL SINGH & ORS. AIR 1980 SC 319 “Allegation by land owner that statutory power misused to satisfy personal ends of an individual with political influence - No attempt to contradict allegation despite opportunity being afforded.”


STATE OF PUNJAB Vs. GURDIAL SINGH & ORS. AIR 1980 SC 319 “After a long interval, the State initiated acquisition proceedings in respect of the same land a second time…………… On a conspectus of the material on the record it does seem that the impugned acquisition proceeding cannot be sustained. There is reason to believe that the statutory power to acquire land has been misued to satisfy the personal ends of the Respondent No. 22, an individual who appears to be not without considerable political influence. Despite an opportunity afforded to controvert the allegations made by the Respondents Nos. 1 to 21, no attempt has been made by him to contradict the allegations……………… It is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man's property is a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious the matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and preemptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons…………………….. The power to select land for acquisition proceedings is left to the responsible discretion of Government under the Act, subject to Articles 14, 19 and 31 (then). The Court is handcuffed in this jurisdiction and cannot raise its hand against what it thinks is a foolish choice. Wisdom in administrative action is the property of the Executive and judicial circumspection keeps the court lock-jawed save where power has been polluted by oblique ends or is otherwise void on well-established grounds…………………………… Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular concept of personal vice. Bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power-sometimes called colourable exercise or fraud on power and often times overlaps motives, passions, and satisfactions-is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. If the use of the power is for the fulfilment of a legal object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested, the court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion……………………. Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end designed. Fraud in this context is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all cases in which the action impugned is to effect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent of the power, whether this be malice-laden or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad. If considerations, foreign to the scope of the power or extraneous to the statute, enter the verdict or impel the action, mala fides or fraud on power vitiates the acquisition or other official act…………………………. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested the court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the mark even in Law when he stated: "I repeat...that all power is a trust-that we are accountable for its exercise-that, from the people, and for the people, all springs, and all must exist".

PUBLIC PURPOSE DISCUSSED ELABORATELY WITH CITATIONS BY SUPREME COURT


CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 6756 of 2003
PETITIONER: Daulat Singh Surana & Others
RESPONDENT: First Land Acquisition Collector & Others
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/11/2006
BENCH: JUSTICE ASHOK BHAN & JUSTICE DALVEER BHANDARI
Judgement can be seen in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.asp

BELOW STATED DECISIONS ARE RELIED BY PARTIES FOR DIFFERENT CONTENTIONS AND PLACED BEFORE HON'BLE COURT
1. Sri Nripati Ghoshal v. Premavati Kapur & Ors. [(1996) 5 SCC 386 (para 4)]
2. First Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli & Anr. [(2002) 4 SCC 160 (para 6)]

3. Raghunath & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [AIR 1988 SC 1615 (para 9)]
4. Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) [AIR 1990 SC 731 (paras 8 & 9)]
5. State of West Bengal v. Bireshwas Dutta Estate (P) Ltd. [(2000) 1 Calcutta Law Times 165(HC) (para 37)].
6. Sailendra Narayana Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa [AIR 1956 SC 346 (para 8)


Public Purpose has been defined in the Land Acquisition Act as under:-
"(f) the expression "public purpose" includes

(i) the provision of village-sites, or the extension, planned development or improvement of existing village sites;
(ii) the provision of land for town or rural planning;
(iii) the provision of land for planned development of land from public funds in pursuance of any scheme or policy of Government and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part in lease, assignment or outright sale worth the object of securing further development as planned;
(iv) the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State;
(v) the provision of land for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced to affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State;
(vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government, or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, or a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State;
(vii) the provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by Government or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority;
(viii) the provision of any premises or building for locating a public office;
but does not include acquisition of land for Companies."


Public purpose will include a purpose in which the general interest of community as opposed to the interest of an individual is directly or indirectly involved. Individual interest must give way to public interest as far as public purpose in respect of acquisition of land is concerned.

In the Constitution of India, some guidelines can be traced as far as public purpose is concerned in Article 37 of the Constitution. The provisions contained in this Part (Directive Principles of the State Policy) shall not be enforceable by any Court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country. It shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.

According to Article 39 of the Constitution, the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good. The laws made for the purpose of securing the constitutional intention and spirits have to be for public purpose.

The term 'public purpose' has been defined in Black Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition) as under: "A public purpose or public business has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political division, as, for example, a state, the sovereign powers of which are exercised to promote such public purpose or public business."


Public purpose is bound to vary with times and prevailing conditions in the community or locality and, therefore, the legislature has left it to the State (Government) to decide what is public purpose and also to declare the need of a given land for the purpose. The legislature has left the discretion to the Government regarding public purpose. The Government has the sole and absolute discretion in the matter.

In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh reported in AIR 1952 SC 252 at page 259, a Constitution Bench of this Court considered the expression 'public purpose'. Mahajan, J. explained the expression 'public purpose' in the following manner:"The expression "public purpose" is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs. The point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual."

In that case, S. R. Das, J. observed as under:"We must regard as public purpose all that will be calculated to promote the welfare of the people as envisaged in the Directive Principles of State policy whatever else that expression may mean."

Almost a century ago, in Hamabai v. Secretary of State reported in (1911) 13 Bom LR 1097, Batchelor, J. observed: "General definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided where the avoidance is possible, and I make no attempt to define precisely the extent of the phrase 'public purpose' in the lease; it is enough to say that, in my opinion, the phrase, whatever else it may mean, must include a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned" received the approval of the Privy Council".

The definition of public purpose has been relied in number of subsequent decisions including the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court.The concept of public purpose was dealt in great detail in a leading American case Munn v. Illinois reported in (1877) 94 US 113: 24 L. Ed 77 and in some other cases. The doctrine declared is that property becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large and from such clothing the right of the legislature is deduced to control the use of the property and to determine the compensation which the owner may receive for it. Field, J. observed as follows: "The declaration of the Constitution of 1870, that private buildings used for private purposes shall be deemed public institutions, does not make them so. The receipt and storage of grain in a building erected by private means for that purpose does not constitute the building a public warehouse. There is no magic in the language, though used in a constitutional convention, which can change a private business into a public one, or alter the character of the building in which the business is transacted."


In United Community Services v. Omaha Nat. Bank 77 N.W.2d 576, 585, 162 Neb. 786, the Court observed that a public purpose has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, security, prosperity, contentment, and the general welfare of all the inhabitants.

In People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago R.R. Terminal Authority, 151 N.E.2d 311, 314, 14 III.2d 230 the Court observed that public purpose is not static concept, but is flexible, and is capable of expansion to meet conditions of complex society that were not within contemplation of framers of Constitution.
In Green v. Frazier, 176 N.W. 11, 17, 44 N.D. 395, the Court observed that a public purpose or public business has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political division, as, for example, a state, the sovereign powers of which are exercised to promote such public purpose or public business.In the words of Lord Atkinson in Central Control Board v. Cannon Brewery Co. Ltd. (1919) A.C. 744, the power to take compulsorily raises by implication a right to payment.

The power of compulsory acquisition is described by the term "eminent domain". This term seems to have been originated in 1525 by Hugo Grotius, who wrote of this power in his work "De Jure Belli et Pacis" as follows : "The property of subjects is under the eminent domain of the State, so that the State or he who acts for it may use and even alienate and destroy such property, not only in the case of extreme necessity, in which even private persons have a right over the property of others, but for ends of public utility, to which ends those who founded civil society must be supposed to have intended that private ends should give way. But it is to be added that when this is done the State is bound to make good the loss to those who lose their property." The Court observed that the requirement of public purpose is implicit in compulsory acquisition of property by the State or, what is called, the exercise of its power of 'Eminent Domain'.The Court further observed that the principle of compulsory acquisition of property, says Cooley (in Vol. II at p. 113, Constitutional Limitations) is founded on the superior claims of the whole community over an individual citizen but is applicable only in those cases where private property is wanted that public use, or demanded by the public welfare and that no instance is known in which it has been taken for the mere purpose of raising a revenue by sale or otherwise and the exercise of such a power is utterly destructive of individual right.

In The State of Bombay v. R.S. Nanji (1956) SCR 18, the Court observed that it is impossible to precisely define the expression 'public purpose'. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined in order to determine whether a public purpose has been established. Prima facie, the Government is the best judge as to whether public purpose is served by issuing a requisition order, but it is not the sole judge. The courts have the jurisdiction and it is their duty to determine the matter whenever a question is raised whether a requisition order is or is not for a public purpose. In the said case, the Court observed that the phrase 'public purpose' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directlyand vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose'. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established. In that case, the Court also referred to the following cases: The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji & Another (1955) 1 SCR 777 and The State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan (1955) 2 SCR 867.


In Somawanti v. State of Punjab (1963) 2 SCR 774, the Court observed that public purpose must include an object in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned. Public purpose is bound to change with the times and the prevailing conditions in a given area and, therefore, it would not be a practical proposition even to attempt an extensive definition of it. It is because of this that the legislature has left it to the Government to say what is a public purpose and also to declare the need of a given land for a public purpose.

The Constitution Bench of this Court in Somawanti (supra) observed that whether in a
particular case the purpose for which land was needed was a public purpose or not was for the Government to be satisfied about and the declaration of the Government would be final subject to one exception, namely that where there was a colourable exercise of the power the declarations would be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party.

In Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay & Others (1961) 1 SCR 128, the Court observed as under: "It will thus be noticed that the expression 'public purpose' has been used in its generic sense of including any purpose in which even a fraction of the community may be interested or by which it may be benefited."


The Constitution Bench in Satya Narain Singh v. District Engineer, P.W.D., Ballia and Anr. reported in AIR 1962 SC 1161 while describing public service observed :-"It is undoubtedly not easy to define what is "public service" and each activity has to be considered by itself for deciding whether it is carried on as a public service or not. Certain activities will undoubtedly be regarded as public services, as for instance, those undertaken in the exercise of the sovereign power of the State or of governmental functions. About these there can be no doubt. Similarly a pure business undertaking though run by the Government cannot be classified as public service. But where a particular activity concerns a public utility a question may arise whether it falls in the first or the second category. The mere fact that that activity may be useful to the public would not necessarily render it public service. An activity however beneficial to the people and however useful cannot, in our opinion, be reasonably regarded as public service if it is of a type which may be carried on by private individuals and is carried on by government with a distinct profit motive. It may be that plying stage carriage buses even though for hire is an activity undertaken by the Government for ensuring the people a cheap, regular and reliable mode of transport and is in that sense beneficial to the public".


In Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1966) 3 SCR 885, while Justice Wanchoo and Justice Shah dissenting from judgment observed that there can be no doubt that the phrase 'public purpose' has not a static connotation, which is fixed for all times. There can also be no doubt that it is not possible to lay down a definition of what public purpose is, particularly as the concept of public purpose may change from time to time. There is no doubt however that public purpose involves in it an element of general interest of the community and whatever furthers the general interest must be regarded as a public purpose.


In Bhim Singhji v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 166, as per Sen, J., the concept of public purpose necessarily implies that it should be a law for the acquisition or requisition of property in the interest of the general public, and the purpose of such a law directly and vitally subserve public interest. Broadly speaking the expression 'public purpose' would however include a purpose in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individuals is directly and virtually concerned.

In Laxman Rao Bapurao Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1997) 3 SCC 493, this Court observed that "it is for the State Government to decide whether the land is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose and whether it is suitable or adaptable for the purpose for which the acquisition was sought to be made. The mere fact that the authorized officer was empowered to inspect and find out whether the land would be adaptable for the public purpose, it is needed or is likely to be needed, does not take away the power of the Government to take a decision ultimately".

In Scindia Employees' Union v. State of Maharashtra & Others reported in (1996) 10 SCC 150, this Court observed as under:"The very object of compulsory acquisition is in exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State against the wishes or willingness of the owner or person interested in the land. Therefore, so long as the public purpose subsists the exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be questioned. Publication of declaration under Section 6 is conclusive evidence of public purpose. In view of the finding that it is a question of expansion of dockyard for defence purpose, it is a public purpose."


The right of eminent domain is the right of the State to reassert either temporarily or permanently its dominion over any piece of land on account of public exigency and for public good.

In the case of Coffee Board v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes reported in (1988) 3 SCC 263, the Court observed that the eminent domain is an essential attribute of sovereignty of every State and authorities are universal in support of the definition of eminent domain as the power of the sovereign to take property for public use without the owner's consent upon making just compensation.

The power of eminent domain is not exercisable in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence except on condition of payment of compensation. In V.G. Ramachandran's Law of Land Acquisition and Compensation (Eighth Edition) by G.C. Mathur, it is stated (at page 1)-"In United States, the power of eminent domain is founded both on the Federal (Fifth Amendment) and on the State Constitutions. The scope of the doctrine in America stands considerably circumscribed by the State Constitutions. Now, the Constitution limits the power to taking for a public purpose and prohibits the exercise of power of eminent domain without just compensation. The process of exercising the power of eminent domain now is commonly referred to as 'condemnation' or 'expropriation'."


A seven-Judge Bench of this Court in The State of Karnataka & Another v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy & Another reported in (1977) 4 SCC 471, explained the expression 'public purpose' in the following words: "6. It is indisputable and beyond the pale of any controversy now as held by this Court in several decisions including the decision in the case of His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalaveru v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 1 - popularly known as Fundamental Rights case - that any law providing for acquisition of property must be for a public purpose. Whether the law of acquisition is for public purpose or not is a justifiable issue. But the decision in that regard is not to be given by any detailed inquiry or investigation of facts. The intention of the legislature has to be gathered mainly from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act and its Preamble. The matter has to be examined with reference to the various provisions of the Act, its context and set up, the purpose of acquisition has to be culled out therefrom and then it has to be judged whether the acquisition is for a public purpose within the meaning of Article 31(2) and the law providing for such acquisition.

ROAD EXTENT AND ENCROACHMENT – SC CASE LAW

ROAD EXTENT AND ENCROACHMENT – SC CASE LAW


More than a century ago in Attorney General v. Corporation of Sunder Land, 1875-76(2) Ch.D 634, the position of the municipal authorities with regard to public parks, gardens, squares and streets was put at par with a trustee, and it was held that the municipal authorities would be guilty of breach of trust in employing any part thereof for purposes other than those contemplated by the relevant statute


1. Supreme Court of India in K.R. Shenoy v Udipi Municipality, AIR 1974 SC 2177. In the above case, the Municipality of Udipi had granted permission for construction of Cinema Hall in a place which was reserved for residential purposes. This action of the Municipality was struck down by observing that the Municipal authorities are supposed to enforce a scheme and not to act in breach thereof. It would be apt to quote what was said by the Supreme Court :- "Where the Municipality acts in excess of the powers conferred by the Act or abuses those powers then in those cases it is not exercising its jurisdiction irregularly or wrongly but it is usurping powers which it does not possess. The right to build on his own land is a right incidental to the ownership of that land. Within the Municipality the exercise of that right has been regulated in the interest of the community residing within its limits of the Municipal Committee. If under pretence of any authority which the law does give to the Municipality it goes beyond the like of its authority and infringes or violates the rights of others, it becomes like all other of the Courts. If sanction is given to build by contravening a bye-law the jurisdiction of the Courts will be invoked on the ground that the approval by an authority of building plans which contravene the bye-laws made by that authority is illegal and inoperative."

2. The same concern was shown by the Supreme Court of India in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa, AIR 1991 SC 1902. In this case action of the local authority which was destructive of environment was set at naught.


3. The decisions given by the Supreme Court of India be also noticed. In Municipality v. Mahadeoji, AIR 1965 SC 1147 it observed that inference of dedication of a highway to the public may be drawn from a long user of the highway by the public. It was observed : "The width of the highway so dedicated depends upon the extent of the user. The side land are ordinarily included in the road for they are necessary for the proper maintenance of the road. In the case of a pathway used for a long time by the public, its topographical and permanent landmark and the manner and mode of its maintenance usually indicate the extent of the user." In Manglore Municipality v. Mahadeoji, AIR 1965 SC 1147, it was observed that :- "Inference of dedication of a highway to the public may be drawn from a long user of the highway by the public. The width of the highway so dedicated depends upon the extent of the user. The side lands are ordinarily included in the road for they are necessary for the proper maintenance of the road. In the case of a pathway used for a long time by the public, its topographical and permanent landmark and the manner and mode of its maintenance usually indicate the extent of the user."

4. State of U. P. v. Ata Mohd., AIR 1980 SC 1785, it was held that street would vest in the Corporation only qua the street and not as absolute property. What is vested in the Municipality is not general property or a species of property known to the common law but a special property created by a statute and vested in a corporate body for public purposes. Such vesting enables the Corporation to use the Street as a street and not for any other purpose. Not only pavements but verandahs in front of the shops are part of streets and public streets. State of U. P. v. Ata Mohd.. AIR 1980 SC 1785. The Supreme Court held if the municipality put the street to any other user than that for which, it was intended, the State as its owner, was entitled to intervene and maintain an action to get any person in illegal occupation evicted.

5. Supreme Court in the case of M/s Gobind Pershad v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1993 SC 2313. In this case verandahs in Connaught Circus in New Delhi were held to be part of public streets. In para 12 of the judgment it was observed as under : "We see no ground to differ with the concurrent findings of the Court below and hold that the appellant has dedicated the Verandah in dispute to the public-use. It is being used for passing and repassing by the public at large and as such is a "street" in terms of section 3(13)(a) of the Act. The appellant has thus surrendered his rights in the property for the benefit of the public. The user of the property is and always shall be with the public. Any space, passage, verandah, alley, road or footway dedicated to public by the owner for passing and repassing, partakes the character of a "street" and no longer remains under the control of the owner has no right at all times to prevent the public from using the same. When the owner of the . property has, by his own violation permitted his property to be converted into a "street", then he has no right to claim any compensation when the same property is made "public street" under section 17(4) of the Act. The "streets" are meant for public use. It is necessary that the "streets" which are being used by the public are frequently repaired and are also saved from public abuse. It is common knowledge that in the absence of any regulatory control the hawkers and squatters are likely to occupy the "streets" thereby creating nuisance for the public. In a situation like this it is necessary for the committee to step in and exercise its powers under section 17(4) of the Act. The Committee exercises regulatory control and is responsible for the repair and upkeep of the "public streets". The verandah in dispute is a "street". It has been declared as a "public street" for the better enjoyment of the public right in the said street. We hold that when a "street" is declared as "public street" the owner of the property comprising the said "street", has no right to claim compensation."

6. In another case, the Zoning Authority had prevented the spread of a commercial venture as a hotel in and around a lake in the State of Tamilnadu. The local administration did not permit it. The Chief Minister interfered with the local self-government in the district. The Supreme Court was not appreciative of the fact that in such matters of discipline in urban construction and environment protection instructions should be given from the top which result in for violation of planned urban habitats. Pleasant Stay Hotel v. Pilani Conservation Council. 1995 (6) SCC 127.

7. In the case of Bombay Hawkers' Union v. Bombay Municipal Corporation. AIR 1985 SC 1206. the Supreme Court held that "No one has any right to do his or her trade or business so as to cause nuisance, annoyance or inconvenience to the other members of the public. Public Streets, by their very nomenclature and definition, are meant for the use of the general public. They are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private trade or business. If hawkers were to be conceded the right claimed by them, they could hold the society to ransom by squatting on the centre of busy thoroughfares, thereby paralysing all civic life. Indeed, that is what some of them have done in some parts of the city. They have made it impossible for the pedestrians to walk on footpaths or even on the streets properly so-called".

8. In the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180, the Supreme Court held that a municipality is empowered to cause to be removed encroachments on footpaths or pavements over which the public have a right of passage or access. In this case the Supreme Court also observed that "...............In the first place, footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public streets". The Supreme Court was also dismissing misplaced arguments resting on life and liberty by those who were claiming occupation of public streets. In this regard, the Supreme Court observed that ".....There is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the claim of the pavement dwellers to put up constructions on pavements and that of the pedestrians to make use of the pavements for passing and repassing, are competing claims and that, the former should be preferred to the latter".

9. In the case of Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Gumam Kaur, AIR 1989 SC 38, the Supreme Court reiterated the law that to remove an encroachment of a public road is the obligation of a municipality and that an injunction could not be granted to suffer an encroachment of a public place like a street which is meant for the use of the pedestrians.

10. In the case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. D. Balwantsingh. JT 1992 (2) SC 363, the Supreme Court negatived the plea of an occupier of a public street when he obtained an injunction in a suit to prevent the removal of an encroachment. The Supreme Court reiterated its earlier decisions. Removal of encroachment was upheld ; so was the action of the municipal corporation to shift the hawkers to an alternate site.

11. In the case of Gobind Pershad Jagdish Pershad v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1993 SC 2313, the Supreme, Court extended the public street into the verandhas in front of a shop which by long user had been used by the public as a passage. Thus, shopping arcades or verandhas adjoining public streets were given the declaration of a public street. Encroachment of such verandhas in front of public streets was held as illegal.

12. Case of Dr. G.N. Khajuria and Ors. Appellants v. Delhi Development Authority and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 253 In paragraph 10, Hon'ble Apex Court observes: --Before parting, we have an observation to make. The same is that a feeling is gathering ground that where unauthorised constructions are demolished on the force of the order of Courts, the illegality is not taken care of fully inasmuch as the Officers of the statutory body who had allowed the unauthorised construction to be made or make illegal allotments go scot free. This should not, however, have happened for two reasons. First, it is the illegal action/order of the Officer which lies at the root of the unlawful act of the concerned citizen, because of which the Officer is more to be blamed than the recipient of the illegal benefit. It is thus imperative, according to us, that while undoing the mischief which would require the demolition of the unauthorised construction, the delinquent Officer has also to be punished in accordance with law. This, however, seldom happens. Secondly, to take care of the injustice completely, the Officer who had misused his power has also to be properly punished. Otherwise, what happens is that the officer, who made the hay when the sun shined, retains the hay, which tempts other to do the same. This really gives fillip to the commission of tainted acts, whereas the aim should be opposite.

13. In Municipal Committee, Karnal, Appellant v. Nirmala Devi , Hon'ble Apex Court has considered encroachment on public street and has held that Municipal Committee had power to have said unauthorised encroachment and construction removed and to recover the costs thereof from such encroacher. Thereby, the Municipal Committee has necessary power to have the unauthorised construction removed and encroacher ejected. If the encroacher does not voluntarily remove the unauthorised construction, the Municipal Committee has power to have it removed by exercise of the power vested under Section 181(2) of the Act. Since the Committee has exercised the statutory power, the award of damages is clearly illegal, unwarranted and unsustainable.

14. In case of Cantorment Board, Jabalpur v. S.N. Awasthi reported at 1995 Supp (4) SCC 595, Hon'ble Apex Court has in paragraph 5 held that construction made in contravention of law cannot be a premium to extend equity so as to facilitate violation of mandatory requirements of law and High Court was not justified in extending equity on this ground.
15. In Debashis Roy v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation reported at 2005 (12) SCC 317, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the issue about legality or otherwise of conversion of user of parking space in residential area for commercial purposes permitted by Municipal Corporation was not a dispute between private parties and essentially involved an element of public interest.

16. In M.I. Builders v. Radhey Shyam Sahu Hon'ble Apex Court 1996(6) SCC 464 has observed that any commercial activity in unauthorised constructions puts additional burden on locality and it is the primary concern of Court to eliminate the negative impact which it will have on environmental conditions in the area and the congestion that will aggravate on account of increased traffic and people visiting such complex. It is also observed that while directing demolition of unauthorised construction, the Court should also direct an inquiry as to how the unauthorised construction came about and to bring the offenders to book and it is not enough to order demolition only.

17. Observations of Hon'ble Apex Court in M.C. Mehtav. U.O.I. 2006(2) SCALE 364 Judgement dated 16-02-2006, reveal that user, commercial residential is very relevant and occupation load has large impact on various facilities including water, sanitation and drainage. Master plans are prepared to take care of future needs by experts after looking into various aspects like healthy living, environment, Lung space need, land use intensity, areas where residential houses are to be built and were commercial buildings are to be located, need of household industries etc.. Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that though task of implementation may be difficult, the Court cannot remain the mute spectator when the violations also affect the environment and healthy living of law abiders. The enormity of the problem cannot be a deterrent factor in this respect. It is observed that various laws are enacted, master plans are prepare by expert planners, provision is made in the plans also to tackle the problem of existing unauthorised constructions and misusers and, still such illegal activities go on unabated openly under the gaze of everyone without having any respect and regard for law and other citizens. Hon'ble Court has also observed that laws are not enforced and the orders of the Court are not properly implemented resulting into total lawlessness. It has observed that therefore it is necessary to identify and take appropriate action against officers responsible for this state of affairs because such blatant misuse of properties at large-scale do not take place without connivance of concerned officers. Hon'ble Court therefore found it proper to constitute a Monitoring Committee and the issue of accountability of officers and also the exact manner of applicability of "Polluters Pay Principle" to owners and officers could be taken up after misuser is stopped at least on main roads in New Delhi. The Hon'ble Apex Court has thereafter in last paragraph issue directions about giving of individual notices for stopping of misuser, filing of affidavit to that effect by owners and sealing of premises in default.

18. Constitutional Bench judgment Sodhan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee (AIR 1989 SC 1988) has laid down that “poverty cannot be the reason to permit encroachments on public lands/roads”. “Street trading-An age old vocation adopted by human beings to earn living--No justification to deny citizens right to earn livelihood using public streets for trade or business--Regulatory measures and reasonable restrictions can be imposed”. “A member of the public is entitled to legitimate user of the road other than actually passing or re-passing through it, provided that he does not create an unreasonable obstruction which may inconvenience other persons having similar right to pass and does not make excessive use of the road to the prejudice of the others. Liberty of an individual comes to an end where the liberty of another commences”. “ What will constitute public nuisance and what can be included in the legitimate user can be ascertained only by taking into account all the relevant circumstances including the size of the road, the amount of traffic and the nature of the additional use one wants to make of the public streets. This has to be judged objectively and here comes the role of public authorities”. “The right to carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, on street pavements, if properly regulated, cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively for passing or re-passing and for no other use. Proper regulation is, however, a necessary condition as otherwise the very object of laying out roads--to facilitate traffic--may be defeated. Allowing the right to trade without appropriate control is likely to lead to unhealthy competition and quarrel between traders and travelling public and sometimes amongst the traders themselves resulting in chaos. The right is subject to reasonable restrictions under clause (6) of Article 19”. “The proposition that all public streets and roads in India vest in the State but that the State holds them as trustee on behalf of the public and the members of the public are entitled as beneficiaries to use them as a matter of right, and that this right is limited only by the similar rights possessed by every other citizens to use the pathways and further that the State as trustee is entitled to impose all necessary limitations on the character and extent of the user, should be treated as of universal application. The provisions of the Municipal Acts should be construed in the light of the above proposition and they should receive a beneficent interpretation”. “The petitioners do have the fundamental right to carry on a trade or business of their choice, but not to do so on a particular place, as circumstances are likely to change from time to time. But that does not mean that the licence has to be granted on a daily basis; that arrangement cannot be convenient to anybody, except in special circumstances”. “Some of the hawkers in big cities are selling very costly luxury articles including sophisticated electronic goods, sometimes imported or smuggled. The authorities will be fully justified to deny to such hawkers any facility. They may frame rules in such manner that it may benefit only the poor hawkers incapable of investing a substantial amount for starting the business. Attempt should be made to make the scheme comprehensive, dealing with every relevant aspect, for example, the charges to be levied, the procedure for grant and revocation of the licences, etc”. “Street trading is an age-old vocation adopted by human beings to earn living. It is one of the traditionally recognised business or trade in England. This is so in spite of the fact that there is a complete social security in that country and as such no compulsion on the citizens to be driven to street trading out of poverty or unemployment. On the other hand, abysmal poverty in India warrants outright rejection of the argument that nobody has a right to engage himself in 'street trading”.

19. Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan Judgement dated 11-10-1996.It is observed as follows: “It is apparent that plaintiff or applicant who wants his encroachments on Public Road to be protected by any interim order has to satisfy the court about existence of any legal right in his favour to maintain such encroachment during pendency of suit and for that purpose, he has to point out some title in him authorising him to occupy the portion of public Road or footpath etc.. In the absence of any such legal right, the encroacher cannot be permitted to obstruct the free flow of traffic or cause inconvenience to public at large. Mere long possession or user cannot be an answer to tilt the balance in his favour when in other pan of balance, the Court has to weigh interest of public at large. Even the threat of loosing source of livelihood cannot be, by itself a circumstance in favour of such applicant. He encroached upon public road or footpath knowing fully well that nobody can clothe him with authority to occupy and use it for his private gain. He cannot feign ignorance of provisions of Law and try to raise equity in his favour. Court of Law cannot permit such wrongdoer to continue to injure public at large during pendency of suit. Hence, his plaint itself must contain sufficient material and facts to satisfy the court that the convenience & interest of public at large must suffer because of legal right in his favour, which will be a very rare case”.”Encroachment of public property undoubtedly obstructs and upsets planned development, echology and sanitation. Public property needs to be preserved and protected. It is but the duty of the State and local bodies to ensure the same. This would answer the second question. As regards the fourth question, it is to reiterate that judicial review is the basic structure of the Constitution. Every citizen has a fundamental right to redress the perceived legal injury through judicial process. The encroachers are no exceptions to that Constitutional right to judicial redressal. The Constitutional Court, therefore, has a Constitutional duty as sentinel qui vive to enforce the right of a citizen when the he approaches the Court for perceived legal injury, provided he establishes that he has a right to remedy. When an encroacher approaches the Court, the Court is required to examine whether the encroacher had any right and to what extent he would be given protection and relief. In that behalf, it is the salutary duty of the State or the local bodies or any instrumentality to assist the Court by placing necessary factual position and legal setting for adjudication and for granting/refusing relief appropriate to the situation. Therefore, the mere fact that the encroachers have approached the Court would be no ground to dismiss their cases. The contention of the appellant-Corporation that the intervention of the Court would aid impetus to the encroachers to abuse the judicial process is untenable. As held earlier, if the appellant-Corporation or any local body or the State acts with vigilance and prevents encroachment immediately, the need to follow the procedure enshrined as a inbuilt fair procedure would be obviated. But if they allow the encroachers to remain in settled possession sufficiently for long time, which would be a fact to be established in an appropriate case, necessarily suitable procedure would be required to be adopted to meet the fact situation and that, therefore, it would be for the respondent concerned and also for the petitioner to establish the respective claims and it is for the Court to consider as to what would be the appropriate procedure required to be adopted in the given facts and circumstances”. “It is true that in all cases it may not be necessary, as a condition for ejectment of the encroacher, that he should be provided with an alternative accommodation at the expense of the State which if given due credence, is likely to result in abuse of the judicial process. But no absolute principle of universal application would be laid in this behalf. Each case is required to be examined on the given set of facts and appropriate to the facts of the case. Normally, the Court suitable to the facts of the case. Normally, the Court may not, as a rule, directs that the encroacher should be provided with an alternative accommodation before ejectment when they encroached public properties, but, as stated earlier, each case required examination and suitable direction appropriate to the facts requires modulation”.

20. Syed Muzaffar Ali v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported at 1995 Supp (4) SCC 426 shows that Hon Apex Court has observed that mere departure from the authorised plan or putting up the construction without sanction does not ipso facto and without more necessarily and inevitably justify demolition of structure. Some cases may be amenable to compounding while the other cases of grave & serious breaches of licensing provisions or building regulations may warrant demolition. Therefore the burden is entirely upon plaintiff or applicant to satisfy the court with material as mentioned above or other relevant material to show that his structure does not violate zoning regulations or development control rules or building bylaws. If after considering such material and after considering the provisions of relevant Law, the Court is satisfied that the unauthorised structure forming subject matter of suit before it can be compounded legally, it can proceed to grant temporary injunction.

21. Bombay High Court in case of Vinayak S Bhapat Vs SP Chandrapur (AIR 2005 Bom R 328) has quoted the Judgement of Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported at 1993(3) SCC 161 the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the issue of grant of temporary injunction in detail from paragraph 30 onwards. The observations made also show that such plaintiff is interested only in getting an order of interim injunction and Hon'ble Apex Court has pointed out that normally such relief is not to be granted without issuing notice to the other side. Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that on many occasions even public interest suffers because of such interim orders. In view of these detail observations of Hon'ble Apex Court, it is not necessary for us to repeat the same again here. However, we have pointed out some of the circumstances which may be relevant for trial court to find out whether applicant has approached it with clean hands and whether there exists any prima facie case in his favour. The encroacher or person who has raised unauthorised structure wants to perpetuate his illegality or irregularity as long as possible and for that purpose wants to engage himself in long drawn legal battle. If in such situation any officer of sanctioning authority who has to defend the action of local body before Court is acting in collusion with such applicant, the local body may avoid to file reply or avoid to defend itself effectively and take adjournments. In that event, the proceedings in court can easily be delayed by applicant and he can continue to enjoy the shelter of interim order. The local body or executive can thereafter defend its inaction by pointing out such pendency in Court as is being done before us. The Court granting such temporary injunction therefore cannot forget its role as custodian and guardian of public interest and it has to safeguard such larger interest independently. Hence, if such temporary injunctions are granted, Court granting it must fix an outer limit beyond which it will not operate. Not only this, if it finds that local body/authority is not co-operating in the matter, it can record an order to that effect and impose heavy costs upon such local authority or officer prima facie found guilty in the matter. In appropriate cases, it can also direct that such costs should be recovered from the officer concerned personally and it can also proceed in contempt against such body or officer. Simultaneously it can also forward copy of its order to concerned Collector or R.D.M.A.for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against such person. If such order is received by Collector or R.D.M.A., the latter shall be under obligation to immediately proceed departmentally against the officer named in the order. The steps about asking the applicant/plaintiff to submit his actual plan for consideration of sanctioning authority as suggested above, in the meanwhile, will also subserve the ends of justice. The advocates appearing for contesting parties before such Court must also ensure that no blame for long pendency can be put upon Court and no adjournment should be asked on the ground of nonavailability of advocate by party in whose favour interim order is operating. No doubt, the subordinate Court has got discretion in the matter of grant of adjournment, however, it has to be conscious of abuse of its process by colluding parties or by influential party and take all precautions to curb or avoid it. The guiding factors mentioned above, if followed, will definitely help the subordinate Court in achieving this goal.

22. Those observations of Hon'ble Apex Court in Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union v. Municipal Corporation Greater Bombay (Judgement dated 12-02-2007) The restrictions/conditions on which the hawkers shall do the business are :

(1) an area of 1 mtr x 1 mtr on one side of the footpath wherever they exist or on an extreme side of the carriage way, in such a manner that the vehicular and pedestrian traffic is not obstructed and access to shops and residences is not blocked. We further clarify that even where hawking is permitted, it can only be on one side of the footpath or road and under no circumstances on both sides of the footpaths or roads. We however clarify that Aarey/Sarita stalls and sugar cane vendors would require and may be permitted an area of more than 1 Mt. by 1 Mt. but not more than 2 Mt. by 1 Mt;

(2) Hawkers must not put up stalls or place any tables, stand or such other thing or erect any type of structure. They should also not use handcarts. However they may protect their goods from the sun, rain or wind. Obviously this condition would not apply to Aarey/sarita stalls;

(3) There should be no hawking within 100 meters from any place of worship, holy shrine, educational institutions and hospitals or within 150 meters from any municipal or other markets or from any railway station. There should be no hawking on foot-bridges and over-bridges. Further certain areas may be required to be kept free of hawkers for security reasons. However outside places of worship hawkers can be permitted to sell items required by the devotees for offering to the deity or for placing in the place of worship e.g. flowers, sandalwood, candles, agarbattis, coconuts etc.;

(4) The hawkers must not create any noise or play any instrument or music for attracting the public or the customers;

(5) They can only sell cooked foods, cut fruits juices and the like. We are unable to accept submission that cooking should be permitted. We direct that no cooking of any nature whatsoever shall be permitted. Even where cooked food or cut fruits or the like are sold, the food must not be adulterated or unhygienic. All municipal licensing regulations and the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act must be complied with;

(6) Hawking must be only between 7.00 am and 10.00 pm;

(7) Hawking will be on the basis of payment of a prescribed fee to be fixed by BMC. However the payment of prescribed fee shall not be deemed to authorize the hawker to do his business beyond prescribed hours and would not confer on the hawker the right to do business at any particular place;

(8) The hawkers must extend full co-operation to the municipal conservancy staff for cleaning the streets and footpaths and also to the other municipal staff for carrying on any municipal work. They must also co-operate with the other Government and public agencies such as Best undertaking, Bombay Telephones, BSES Ltd. etc. if they require to lay any cable or any development work;

(9) No hawking would be permitted on any street which is less than 8 meters in width. Further the hawkers also have to comply with Development Control Rules thus there can be no hawking in a areas which are exclusively residential and where trading and commercial activity is prohibited. Thus hawking cannot be permitted on roads and pavements which do not have a shopping line;

(10) BMC shall grant licences which will have photos of the hawkers on them. The licence must be displayed, at all times, by the hawkers on their person by clipping it on to their shirt or coat;


(11) Not more than one member of a family must be given a licence to hawk. For this purpose BMC will have to computerize its records;

(12) Vending of costly items e.g. electrical appliances, video and audio tapes and cassettes, cameras, phones etc. are to be prohibited. In the event of any hawker found to be selling such items his licence must be cancelled forthwith.


(13) In areas other than the Non-Hawking Zones, licences must be granted to the hawkers to do their business on payment of the prescribed fee. The licences must be for a period of 1 year. That will be without prejudice to the right of the Committee to extend the limits of the Non-Hawking Zones in the interests of public health, sanitation, safety, public convenience and the like. Hawking licences should not be refused in the Hawking Zones except for good reasons. The discretion not to grant a hawking licence in the Hawking Zone should be exercised reasonably and in public interest.

(14) In future, before making any alteration in the scheme, the Commissioner should place the matter before the Committee who shall take a decision after considering views of all concerned including the hawkers, the Commissioner of Police and members of the public or an association representing the public.



(15) It is expected that citizens and shopkeepers shall participate in keeping non-hawking zones/areas free from hawkers. They shall do so by bringing to the notice of the concerned ward officer the presence of a hawker in a non hawking zone/area. The concerned ward officer shall take immediate steps to remove such a hawker. In case the ward officer takes no action a written complaint may be filed by the citizen/shopkeeper to the Committee. The Committee shall look into the complaint and if found correct the Committee will with the help of police remove the hawker. The officer in charge of the concerned police station is directed to give prompt and immediate assistance to the Committee. In the event of the Committee finding the complaint to be correct it shall so record. On the Committee so recording an adverse remark re failure to perform his duty will be entered in the confidential record of the concerned ward officer. If more than three such entries are found in the record of an officer it would be a ground for withholding promotion. If more than 6 such entries are found in the records of an officer it shall be a ground for termination of service. For the work of attending to such complaints BMC shall pay to the Chairman a fixed honorarium of Rupees 10,000/- p.m.


(16) The scheme framed by us will have a binding effect on all concerned. Thus apart from those to whom licenses will now be issued, no other person/body will have any right to squat or carry on any hawking or other business on the roads/streets. We direct the BMC shall bring this judgment to the notice of all Courts in which matters are now pending. We are quite sure that the concerned Court/s shall then suitably vacate/modify its injunction/stay order."



CASE LAW ON LAND LAWS

KARNATAKA LAND LAWS